

Power-Sharing Solutions on Ethnic Conflicts :

A comparative analysis of institutional effects on ethnic politics

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· **Keyword:** ethnic conflicts, institutional solutions, the *Lijphart* school, consociational democracy, integrative democracy, remedial policy.

【ABSTRACT】

The previous literature about institutional solutions on ethnic conflicts expected all positive results. However, empirical findings in this study shows more complicated implications. Power-sharing institutions do not always positively work on resolving ethnic strife. Depending on areas to which institutional solutions and policies are applied, mechanical effects of political institutions engender different political outcomes. In some occasions power-sharing systems can backfire and they possibly cause even serious ethnic conflicts. However, the test results also suggest that designing proper institutions for power sharing and implementing their functions and practical applications should be only peaceful and available alternative in long run.

I . Introduction

Ethnic conflict is a worldwide matter, and the control of it is a significant business of political engineering. It is an undeniable fact that accommodating ethnic (and religious) diversities and remedying current or potential conflicts have become serious challenges to many countries. Many believe that designing and managing proper institutions is a key obtaining ethnic coexistence in troubled regions. Indeed, institutions can play a positive and significant role, if not decisive, to solve ethnic conflicts. Functions of institutions that constrain and channel human behaviors by providing guidance, incentives, and opportunities are the reason of the belief that political engineering will work on this matter. Some students of comparative institutionalism like the *Lijphart School* have paid special attention to the power-sharing functions of certain institutions.

However, the previous studies are limited and incomplete. Although many theoretical explanation or proposals of power-sharing solutions are submitted, not much large-N comparative research have been conducted. This paper explores how democracy, especially the power-sharing features of democratic institutions, assist to solve ethnic conflict. The study examines the roles of several basic political institutions that pursue political and social accommodation among ethnic groups. The cross-sectional time series analysis in this paper provides much rife knowledge of institutional effects on ethnic conflicts than previous studies which dealt with only a case or a time. The following body of the paper starts with brief summary of the theories of ethnic conflicts. Then, it discusses institutional solutions for their resolution based on the *Lijphart School's* theoretical development. In the rest, I propose research design, conduct empirical tests, and provide summary and conclusion.

II . Ethnic Conflicts and Institutional Solutions

Constructivist views on ethnicity deliver meaningful perspective to understand the complicated deployment of different ethnicities formation and ethnopolitics. They see ethnic differences and cleavages are constructed in the course of social, economic, and political interactions. However, the ethnic cleavages do not always become politicized, and consequently they do not always cause ethnic conflict.¹⁾ There are specific processes

1) Gary Cox, *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral System* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

that reinforce ethnic crisis and ultimately cause violent conflicts. Understanding the conflict-causing mechanism is particularly crucial to devise institutional solutions because the institutions are supposed to break or change the mechanism by preventing the potential conditions, structures, and behaviors of ethnic conflicts. Lake and Rothchild succinctly summarize origins and processes of ethnic conflict.

We argue instead that intense ethnic conflict is most often caused by collective fears of the future. As groups begin to fear for their safety, dangerous and difficult-to-solve strategic dilemmas arise that contain within them the potential for tremendous violence. As information failures, problems of credible commitment, and the security dilemma take hold, groups become apprehensive, the state weakens, and conflict becomes more likely. Ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs, operating within groups, build upon these fears of insecurity and polarize society. Political memories and emotions also magnify these anxieties, driving groups further apart. Together, these between-group and within-group strategic interactions produce a toxic brew of distrust and suspicious that can explode into murderous violence.²⁾

Two aspects of such process are crucial to understanding the development of ethnic conflicts, and for guiding the search for institutional solutions: first, how groups perceive each other.³⁾ or groups' collective feelings toward others, for example, "ethnic fear"; second, the role of ethnic activists or ethnic entrepreneurs. Popular perceptions of ethnic *reality* are often determined on the basis of the enemy's image, which bears the seed of violent conflicts. When a group perceives another as a threat or a danger to vital physical, social, or cultural interests, the two groups are not likely to make compromise on the common issues of interests. Even the mere presence of the latter group, or the profane nature of the ideas that the group espouses become the reason to isolate them from us or us from them.⁴⁾ When ethnicity is mobilized in hostile confrontation to 'the others', the collective psyche is prone to demonize and dehumanize 'the others'.

However, these ethnic perceptions are not inevitably formed and developed.⁵⁾ Actors

2) David Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," *International Security*, 21:2 (1996), pp.41-42.

3) Milton Esman, "Power Sharing and the Constitutionist Fallacy," in Markus Crepaz, Thomas Koelble, and David Wilsford, eds., *Democracy and Institutions: The Life Work of Arend Lijphart*, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000).

4) Barrington Moore, *Moral Purity and Persecution in History*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000)

5) David Laitin, *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the Yoruba*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986).

who cultivate those feelings and manipulate them in politics must exist. As the process of psychological displacement from “others” continues and intensifies, “stereotypic perceptions may come to dominate and overwhelm the orderly coexistence of ethnic entities.... This sort of atmosphere, quintessentially irrational, is paradoxically compatible with a perfectly rational exploitation of mass psychosis by communal brokers or entrepreneurs”.⁶⁾ These ethnic entrepreneurs verbalize the beliefs in kinship-bonds and common destinies, mobilize and organize people to claim themselves as a ‘group’, blame other groups as sources of problems they face, and decry acts of accommodation as a sellout of group interests. If they can outbid the moderates inside their own group and mass public show ardent response to their ethnic cards in divided societies, severe ethnic conflicts, which are often violent, are inevitable.

Possible institutional solutions, therefore, can work on these two processes either separately or jointly; the institutions can be designed to remedy culturally and socially constructed collective fear of one group to another by providing more chances of political representation and autonomy, securing group identity and cultures, promoting group interests and well beings, and building trust between groups to be coexist, *inter alia*; they can offers the specific incentive structure to ethnic elites not to appeal for and rely on ethnic cleavages to achieve their political goals. Such institutions tend to confine the behaviors of political actors by giving rules and structuring environment that facilitates strategic coordination over their choices. In other words, institutions work on the level of collectivity of a group and that of elite politics.

However, indeed, such tasks of democratic institutions are not easily achieved because institutions are not sole means by which actors get information for strategic behaviors. For example, in African emerging democracies ethnopolitical cleavages mediate the effects of electoral institutions on party systems, which in turn contributes to the stability of democratic countries where parties are weak and multiethnic coalitions are fluid.⁷⁾ Since democracy itself allows many competing participants, designing institutions becomes enormously complicated work, and institutional functions and effects vary according to different ideas of what democracy should be, different historical experience as a group or a country, which narrows the alternatives of institutions, and diverse political situations that requires consensus and coordination over constitutional choices.

6) Donald Rothchild and Alexander J. Groth, “Pathological Dimensions of Domestic and International Ethnicity,” *Political Science Quarterly*, 110:1 (1995), p.75.

7) Shaheen Mozaffar, James Scarritt and Glen Galaich, “Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africa’s Emerging Democracies,” *American Political Science Review*, 94:3 (2003).

Subsequently, being aware of such difficulties, the next section discusses what and how democratic institutions try to solve ethnic conflict.

III. Democracy, Power-Sharing and Ethnic Conflicts

Though there has been continuous pessimism about the coexistence of ethnic plurality and democracy,⁸⁾ the principle of democracy and its institutions have been also regarded as not only desirable, but also possibly the only hope to resolve ethnic conflicts. This is because the basic rules and mechanisms of democratic politics provide many entries to “the state affairs” for the public and even minorities.⁹⁾ Democracy and democratization is “largely.... a matter of the progressive recognition and inclusion of different groups in the political life of society”.¹⁰⁾ The minorities can organize themselves into interest groups, parties or other forms of affiliation with established parties. Through those organizations, minorities represent themselves in electoral politics, lobby in the process of policy development and implementation, negotiate with governmental officials without appealing the violent methods, and accept governmental appointments for group leaders. These are functions of ethnic conflict resolutions that democracy can provide.

However not all democracies are believed to be capable of generating such functions. Many scholars have argued that majoritarian democracies do not easily coincide with ethnic accommodation.¹¹⁾ Instead, a great attention has been paid to another type of democracy emphasizing power-sharing functions of institutions. The students of

8) Based on the dynamics of “outbidding,” Rabushka and Shepsle identify incentives for competitive aspirant to leadership to accentuate the extreme demands of their constituencies. As unfulfilled demands are turned into grievances and manipulated by other counter elites, leaders are compelled by their survival needs in competitive elections to espouse more extreme positions (Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability*, (Columbus: Merrill, 1972)). This tendency obstruct inter-ethnic compromises. Some empirical findings confirm the pessimism (See Edward Muller and Mitchell Seligson “Civic Culture and Democracy: The Questions of Causal Relationship, *American Political Science Review*, 88:3 (1994); Bingham Powell, *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982)).

9) Timothy Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts*, (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1996).

10) John Dryzek “Political Inclusion and Dynamism of Democratization,” *American Political Science Review*, 90:2 (1996), p.486.

11) Amongst them, see Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); also Sisk (1996); Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Andrew Reynolds, “Majoritarian or Power-sharing Government.” in Crepaz, Koelble and Wilsford eds., (2000)

comparative institutionalism suggest that certain institutions that cultivate and nurture power sharing could be keys to avoid violent conflicts between ethnic groups.¹²⁾

Lijphart first introduced the concept of power sharing more than three decades ago. The concept has been developed and expressed as consociationalism, consensus democracy, and other related forms by his followers and critics. For Lijphart societal pluralism was no impediment to democratic stability. Regarding ethnic solidarities as a politically given condition, he has identified the necessary or favorable institutional practices, principles, and conditions, which promote and complete power-sharing politics in a divided society. Grand, inclusive coalitions, proportionality of representation, minority veto powers, segmental autonomy including territorial and cultural, tradition of elite accommodation, and multi-partism are among those solutions and conditions.¹³⁾

The idea of power-sharing has been developed into two institutional types of democracy in theory: one is *consociational* or *communalist* democracy, and the other is *consensual* or *integrative* democracy.¹⁴⁾ These two types of democracies have a similarity defying majoritarian zero-sum, winner-take-all structure, but neither is completely encompassed by the other. Consociational systems are based on the assumption that in a given plural society, ethnic difference is the most salient issue, and it is a sole driving force of politics. The system perpetuates the importance of ethnicity by including all of the significant ethnic segments, but seeks to minimize their negative consequences. Thus, its institutional traits are expressed as the grand coalition of major ethnic groups,

12) Yash Ghai, "Decentralization and the Accommodation of Ethnic Diversity," in Crawford Young ed., *Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); Bernard Grofman and Andrew Stockwell, "Electoral Systems and the Art of Constitutional Engineering: An Inventory of the Main Findings," in Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra, and Giuseppe Sobrio eds. *Rules and Reasons*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Lijphart (1999); Bojan Todosijevic, "Macro-Political Means of Ethnic Conflict Management in Southeast Europe: A Critical Examination," *Southeast European Politics*, 2(3) (2001).

13) "[Power sharing] can be implemented by a wide variety of methods including, but not limited to those identified by Lijphart. These arrangements may have to be adjusted with changing circumstances. Power sharing may be realized imperfectly, not to full satisfaction of all parties but sufficiently to achieve of peaceful and consensual coexistence" (Esman 2000 102).

14) John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, "Introduction: the macro-political regulation of ethnic conflicts," In Johan McGarry and Brendan O'Leary eds., *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, (New York: Routledge, 1993); Bernard Grofman and Robert Stockwell, "Institutional Design in Plural Societies: Mitigating Ethnic Conflict and Fostering Stable Democracy," paper prepared for delivery at University of Messina Conference on the Political Economy of Institutional Development, (2000); Andrew Reynolds. (2000).

bicameral systems, ethnically segmented federalism, and/or PR systems. All of these are oriented toward active recognition and preservation of ethnic identity and autonomy. Consensus systems, on the other hand, are based on the assumption that in a plural society ethnicity is not [or should not be] the sole driving force of politics. Rather, they seek to minimize the importance of ethnicity and/or seek not to foster a multiethnic character to the state. The institutions are designed to encourage cross-cutting cleavages in society; but they do not guarantee multi-ethnic political parties. The government is usually based on grand coalition with non-ethnic parties. Federalism is multi-ethnically and geographically composed, not culturally divided.

In addition to these institutional setting for elite level politics, some other *social institutions* work at the public levels. Since ethnic crises are developed through not only ethnic entrepreneurs but also by collective fear of a group as a whole, there are dualistic tasks to remedy ethnic strife. Many socio-political and economically remedial (preferential) policies for minority groups have been accepted to soothe ethnic grievances. Legal systems, citizen rights, school systems, language policies, quota for governmental offices, and other allocation rules can be used as mass level social institutions.¹⁵⁾ Although these social institutions may not be decisive to rule how political and economic resources are distributed, their direct impact on the mass public can contribute to control ethnic conflicts. These policies can also be further divided under the consociational vs. consensus contrast; the former enhances and protects the identity of groups and the latter promote the individual rights in general.

However, this dichotomous categorization between consociational and consensus institutions is somewhat idealistic. As a result it is not easy to divide them into actual analytical processes. In practice, usage of each type of institution is highly imbalanced. Grofman and Stockwell admit that they “are reluctant to view institutional design as ‘either/or,’ e.g., designed exclusively with communalist [consociational] aims in mind or designed to foster integration. Mechanisms of both types can coexist and even be mixed within the same political system, even if they fail to follow one or another ‘grand logic’”.¹⁶⁾ Moreover, once the ethnic communities have been mobilized based on their ethnic differences, ideal consensus/integrative strategies are likely to fail¹⁷⁾, or ideal

15) These social policies are clearly distinctive from the segregation of group in education and other social life which prevailed in the U.S. before the Civil Right movement. The remedial polices are often upon the request from minority groups to protect their own cultural and historical identities and to promote their disadvantaged economic and social status. Such goals are definitely missing in the segregation.

16) Grofman and Stockwell (2000), p.21.

17) Esman (2000).

consociational/communalist strategies may increase ethnic hostility by petrifying or even enhancing ethnic differences.

Therefore, the empirical tests for the effects of institutions on ethnic conflicts should be aware of the following two considerations. First, socio-political circumstances and structures are crucial because they are enormously influential to the functions of institutions. In case of ethnic politics examining how political cleavages are structured and what kinds of political issues are salient is the first step to explore the effects of institutions on ethnic conflict. Ethnic group's organizational cohesion may provide a good barometer: if a single organization or party dominantly and exclusively represents an ethnic group, the politics of such societies tend to be segmented by ethnic borders, and consociational approach can be a solution; if multiple organization or parties represent multiple ethnic groups, ethnic issues are not likely dominant and salient issues. In such societies consensus approach can be a solution. Second, no institution is omnipotent. The effects of institutions are sometimes multidirectional. The effects can be positive, negative or neutral. Depending on socio-political circumstances, each institutional solution may produce unexpected results.

IV. Hypotheses: Effects of democracy and institutions on ethnic conflicts

The basic logic and grand theory of institutional solutions to ethnic conflicts seems rather simple: share political power with other groups and ethnic conflicts decrease! Yet more precisely but in a somewhat narrower respect, the task of institutional design is much complicated: *institutions should prevent one or more groups from being structurally and permanently isolated, excluded, and alienated in the process of power and resource allocation due to their ethnic differences.*

This "semi-doctrine" requires the state of art in designing institutions and implementing their functions. It requires two seemingly contradictory tasks. (1) Recognizing and preserving ethnic group identity, institutions encourage political inclusion by guaranteeing the groups the paths of participation. At least, institutions should be able to provide incentives to ethnic groups for staying within the "only game in town" even if a grand coalition is not assured. (2) Reducing or ignoring the differences between ethnic groups, institutions should promote non-ethnic cleavage particularly in electoral politics. In this politics, ethnicity does not compose salient issues, which would change incentive structure for political elite and reduce the possibilities of "outbidding". Members of minority groups can participate in decision-making processes not through

their ethnic organizations, but through umbrella or catch-all organizations.

These seemingly contradictory tasks, however, share the common grounds in practice: impeding monopoly in politics through power sharing, and promoting participation either as ethnic group members or individual citizens. The three political institutions including executive, electoral, and federal/decentralization system make great differences in these tasks. Variations of each system differentiate the degree of power sharing. Amongst them parliamentary, PR and federal systems are definitely more power-sharing oriented institutions. However consociational and consensus natures are not clearly divided between and within these institutions. Rather, the two functions cohabit in each institution. Thus, I keep the three political institutions to see their effects on ethnic conflict. Additionally, another socio-political institution is included for its aforementioned utility in remedying ethnic crisis.

It can be also hypothesized that the institutions works differently according to the nature of dependent variable. In this case I suggest that it can be the degree and dimensions of ethnic conflicts that each country confronts. For example, power-sharing mechanism may work in relatively peaceful circumstances. However, if violent methods are mobilized by at least one of the ethnic groups, power-sharing solutions can be unrealistic because the power sharing needs multiple steps of agreements among multiple parts, relatively long-term experiences and trust between groups. They may be ineffective to impede bloody rebellion. Thus, the present analysis divides the degree of ethnic conflicts. It is critically important to unravel the nature of the relationship between ethnic conflicts and institutional solutions. Gurr divides ethnic conflicts between protest and rebellion according to the magnitudes and strengths of violence in communal political actions.¹⁸⁾ Then he actually finds the variations in trends of protest and rebellion according to the regions and types of communities. This distinction enables the present study to illustrate the different circumstances where groups and ethnic elites lie, and strategic behaviors which they consider and take.

1. Democracy

Democracy may have two opposite effects on ethnic strife. The relationship between democracy and ethnic conflicts has created controversial debates. "No wonder that experts disagree on the potential effects of democratization for destabilizing ethnopolitical conflict: there are roughly an equal number of instances that can be cited

18) Ted Gurr, *Minorities at Risk* (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1993); Ted Gurr, *People versus States*, (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2000).

in support of each position”.¹⁹⁾ The voluminous literature has reported that “ethnic outbidding” is a prevalent phenomenon in ethnically divided democratic polities.²⁰⁾ However, democracy also enables ethnic minorities to express their grievances and needs by constructing a route to institutionalized politics. It assists many ethnically divided countries in holding together their polities. Quoting Albert Hirschman’s famous expression, one may say that since their voices are heard in the decision making process the minority groups do not choose the option of exit with violent ways. At least they maintain loyalty to the polity. After all, the rebellion costs more.

Regarding those two arguments, two hypotheses can be proposed. The present analysis hypothesizes that the effects of democracy is differentiated according to the severity of ethnic conflict. Democracy may enhance peaceful ethnic protests as previous “outbidding” argument presumed, but it may alleviate violent, blood bathing ethnic rebellion by providing less expensive methods to achieve political goals.

Hypotheses 1: Democracy is more likely to trigger ethnic protest, but less likely to bring ethnic rebellion behaviors.

2. Executive Systems

Prevalent ethnic security dilemma theory suggests that in terms of ethnic conflict management, presidential systems are superior to parliamentary systems because of possible checks and balance. Strong leadership that presidential system can institutionally provide may contribute to prevent blood-shedding chaos among antagonist groups. On the contrary, parliamentary systems provide institutional settings of power sharing together with some electoral systems. Possible [grand] coalition and minority veto power, flexible regime or, at least, leader change, and frequent deal and bargaining between groups that cultivate consensual culture are preferred functions for ethnic conflict resolution.

Regarding those arguments, it can be hypothesized that whereas a presidential system is more beneficial in violent ethnic conflicts situations, a parliamentary system is more workable in less violent ethnic strife. Thus, two hypotheses can be suggested.

Hypothesis 2: Rebellious behaviors in ethnic conflicts are more likely in parliamentary systems than presidential systems, but protest behaviors in ethnic

19) Gurr (2000), p.157.

20) Horowitz (1985); Rabushka and Shepsle (1972).

conflicts are more likely in the latter than the former.

3. Electoral Systems

The power of the PR system enhances the power sharing politics. The aim of PR system is to give political power to minority groups at least corresponding to their size. Thus, small ethnic groups' powers still remain small. However, electoral systems, especially PR systems have some political as well as emotional influences reducing ethnic crisis. First, PR systems do not strongly exclude minorities, their high proportionality between votes and seats may offer minorities good chances to be represented. In multiparty system produced by PR, even a small party is able to enjoy veto power. Second, PR systems could help in giving 'a sense of belonging' to the minority. Minorities may feel, at least, that they are a part of the nation state.

But PR system also can boost outbidding mechanism within groups, because political elites do not need to appeal to the members of the other groups. In ethnically divided countries where elections are just demographic censuses, PR may not be proper solution to ethnic conflicts. The choice of electoral system to remedy ethnic conflicts should be dependent on the levels of groups' cohesion to organizations and parties, which distinguish consensus/integrative and consociational/communalist systems.

Hypothesis 3-1: Electoral systems with higher proportionality between votes and seats are less likely to cause ethnic conflict, especially rebellion.

Hypothesis 3-2: The relationship between electoral systems and ethnic conflicts is dependent on the degree of ethnic group cohesiveness. Stronger ethnic cohesiveness, which means there is strong ethnic based parties, is likely to lessen the effects of PR system and cause ethnic conflicts.

4. Federalism and Decentralization

Many studies of institutional design have suggested that decentralization of political power, i.e., transferring centralized authority to lower levels of institutional hierarchy, can remedy ethnic conflicts.²¹ By increasing minorities' power, securing autonomy, and

21) S. Bose "State Crisis and Nationalities Conflict in Sri Lank and Yugoslavia," *Comparative Political Studies*: 28:1. (1995); Frank Cohen, "Proportional Versus Majoritarian Ethnic Conflict Management in Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies*. 30:5 (1997); Ghai (1998); Todosijevic (2000).

guaranteeing self-control, the minorities are more satisfied within larger state, and less motivated to pursue radical separatist political program. Some comparative analyses find that federal systems create different effects according to the dimension of ethnic conflicts.²²⁾ Their findings show that whereas ethnic protest is more likely, ethnic rebellion is less likely in federal systems because federal systems build ways to solve problems in more peaceful ways by bestowing some levels of autonomy of decision-making and preserving group identities. It may lessen at least the possibility of severe ethnic rebellion while ethnic minorities become more sensitive to protect their interest, which leads to more protest.

Based on previous works, two hypotheses can be submitted: whereas decentralization brings more protesting actions, it can reduce rebelling behaviors.

Hypothesis 4: A higher degree of decentralization is more likely to cause protests but less likely to trigger rebellious behaviors.

5. Preferential policies for disadvantaged ethnic minorities

In addition to political institutions at elite levels, there are policy level solutions focusing on the mass public. Political and economic preferential/remedial policies are expected to reduce ethnic discrimination and eventually soothe ethnic grievances. "In addition to political representation and freedom, access to education and employment are crucial component of ethnic accommodation"²³⁾ Those policies are designed to provide opportunities to minorities. "The supposedly fair and difference-blind society is not only inhumane (because suppressing identities) but also, in a subtle and unconscious way, itself highly discriminatory".²⁴⁾ Preferential policies may increase the commitment to equity and belief in distributional justice among citizenry. They may rescue minorities that have been disadvantaged due to histories of colonization and slavery as well as due to continuing discrimination.

However, preferential policies may not always positively work to soothe tensions

22) Cohen (1997): Especially see Stephen Saideman, David Lanoue, and Michael Campenni, "Democratization, Political Institutions and Ethnic Conflicts: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1985-1998," *Comparative Political Studies*, 35:3 (2002).

23) Laura Jenkins, "Preferential Policies for Disadvantaged Ethnic Groups: Employment and Education," in Crawford Young ed., (1998), p.192.

24) Charles Taylor, "Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition," in Amy Gutman ed., *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, an Essay*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p.43.

between ethnic groups. If a group, especially majority group, views such policies for other groups as discrimination threatening their group interests even if those policies are not actually effective, the policies can ignite hostility to each other. Especially in area of economic benefits, ethnic elite can easily manipulate the results of policies to appeal to ethnic identities.

Thus, a hypothesis can be submitted: whereas political remedial policies positively assist to alleviate ethnic conflicts, economic remedial policies enhance antagonism between groups. Political interests are more abstract and its application is somewhat limited within small populations of each group whoever they are favored or non-favored groups. Remedying political interests of minorities do not clearly deplete majorities' interests. Yet some economic remedial policies tend to be of a zero-sum nature; thus, majorities easily feel that their rights and interests are unfairly violated.

Hypothesis 5: More minority favored political preferential policies are less likely to cause ethnic conflicts, but economic preferential policies tend to have an opposite result

V. Research Design and Measurement

In spite of theoretical development and sophistication of policy advice, surprisingly, not many comparative analyses of the relationship between ethnic conflicts and (political) institutions have been conducted. It is also true that only a few large-N comparative studies have been published about institutional effects on various other policy outputs and political and economic outcomes.²⁵⁾ Their scope of analyses has been limited within western or advanced industrial democracies. They also have some other limitations: they miss some important institutional variables; measurements of institutional variables are too simplistic and mainly dichotomous; there is no theoretical consideration about political circumstances like organizational strength of ethnic segments and their embodiment in electoral politics.

I. Data and Cases

The present analysis mainly relies on Gurr's *Minorities at Risk Dataset, phase III*

25) Cohen (1997); Saideman et.al.(2002).

(version 1002). According to Gurr, a minority at risk is a group that “collectively suffers, or benefits, from systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in the country or countries in which it resides,” or it “is the focus of political mobilization and action in defense or promotion of the group’s self-defined interests”.²⁶⁾ The dataset includes 199 minority groups in 118 countries. Since some of the groups are spread over multiple countries, and due to some lack of data, the number of cases decreases. Furthermore, the analysis excludes authoritarian countries. Thus, 139 ethnic groups are explored. The time period covered in this analysis is from 1990 to 1998.

MAR originally does not provide any institutional variables, thus, I added those from other datasets. Database for Political Institutions (DPI) by World Bank is the major data source for institutional variables

2. Testing methods

The test procedures employ bivariate and multivariate analyses. In addition to mean comparison between institutions and ethnic conflicts, pooled cross sectional time series models are conducted. For the mean comparisons the analyses use mean values for ethnic conflicts and economic performance variables. Fixed values are used for institutional and the other variables. Originally, MAR dataset is not formatted for time series analysis, thus; it was transformed for pooled cross-sectional analysis. The unit of analysis is each ethnic group within a country for a given year. The actual maximum number of available observations reaches 1537 group/year after deleting missing values. To deal with autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, the cross-sectional time series analysis includes a lag of the dependent variable, and performs Paris-Winsten regression with panel corrected standard errors.²⁷⁾

3. Variables

Ethnic Conflicts: To measure ethnic conflicts, this study uses three indicators of group conflict behavior in MAR. The dataset provides protest, rebellion, and intercommunal indices respectively. Protest index is coded from score 0, *no protest* to score 5, *large demonstration*. Rebellion index is coded from 0, *no rebellion* to 7, *protracted civil war*.

26) Gurr (1993) p.349.

27) For usage of this method see Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz, “What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross section data in comparative politics. *American Political Science Review*, 89:3, (1995).

Intercommunal conflict index exclusively measures only conflicts between antagonist groups not between the government and groups. This is a six-scale indicator from 0, *not evident* to 6, *communal warfare*. This indicator is used for the comparison with the former two variables.

Democracy: For measuring democracy, two indicators are employed. The first indicator is *regime type* in the MAR III dataset, which is transformed originally from Polity II dataset. It categorizes countries into following four groups: old democracy, young democracy, transitional polity and autocracy. In this analysis this index is mainly used for bivariate tests. The second indicator is Freedom House score. This is composed of two sub-indicators: scores of political rights and political liberty that are coded from 1 to 7. 1 indicates the freest countries and 7 means the least free country. The mean value of two indicators for each year is used for mainly multivariate tests.

Institutions: The major goal of this analysis is to reveal institutional effects on ethnic conflicts. For the object, four types of institutional variables are included. First, for measuring “executive systems”, dichotomous variable are used. 0 is coded for presidential system and 1 is assigned for parliamentary system. But when the test results indicate “parliamentary democracy”, the coding of the dummy variables is slightly changed: 0 is coded for all non-parliamentary systems including presidential systems, non-democratic parliamentary systems, and any other kinds of interim or autocratic regimes; 1 is exclusively coded for parliamentary democracy.

Second, for measuring electoral systems, they are categorized into four types according to their nature of proportionality: plurality, majority, mixed, and PR systems. They are coded from 1 to 4. This indicator is provided by the electoral system dataset of *International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance*. But for more convenient comparison, bivariate analyses uses dichotomous variables for “proportional democracies” and the other systems. In this case, PR system includes mixed systems in which some parts of seats are proportionally distributed.

Third, for gauging decentralization, a composed index from DPI is used for multivariate analyses. DPI provides five indicators for decentralization: autonomous territory, election for state and provinces offices, election for municipal offices, levels of local government’ authority on taxing, spending, and legislature, and senate’ s constituency in state/province. Bivariate analysis, however, uses dichotomous variables for federal system and non-federal system for easy comparison between two systems.

Finally, fourth, MAR III data provides useful indicators for remedial policies. These

indicators are originally composed to measure levels of political and economic discrimination, but they also measure how policies are applied for remedying discrimination. Although they may not be perfect measures for preferential or remedial policies, they properly show how government tries to solve discrimination for each group by policy methods. Mean values are used for bivariate analyses, and annual values are employed for cross-sectional time series analyses.

Other Variables: Besides these institutional variables, some variables for group circumstance are included. First, GDP per capita and annual GDP growth rates are included. Second, groups' political, economic, and cultural differences are included.²⁸⁾ MAR III provides adequate indicators for those variables. Third, groups' organizational cohesion is the most important non-institutional variable in this study. In MAR III group organizational cohesion indicators are "based on the number and scope of support for organizations that represent group interest".²⁹⁾ Each minority is assigned a value of 1 through 7. This variable is particularly important since it shows how ethnic politics are structured in domestic politics, and they are decisive to make institutions work as designed.

VI. Test Results

All of the tests are conducted in two ways. First, pooled cross-sectional time series analyses are conducted. The results are on table 1 that covers only democratic countries, i.e., free and partially free countries in the criteria of Freedom House score. Second, other following tables are bivariate analyses covering each independent variable exclusively. These different test methods and slightly different operationalizations of variables are taken for unraveling complex nature of ethnic conflicts and their relationships with institutions and getting unbiased and robust results.

28) Economic differences are about intergroup differentials in economic status and positions. Political differences are about access to power and to civil service, recruitment, voting rights, the right to organize, and equal legal protection. Cultural differences are about ethnicity/nationality, language, historical origins, religion, custom, and residence.

29) Ted Gurr, *Minorities at Risk III Dataset and Codebook*, (College Park: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 1999), p. 81.

Table 1: Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series Analyses of Protest, Rebellion, and Intercommunal Conflicts in Democracies: 1990~1998
(Prais-Winsten Regressions with Panel Corrected Standard Errors)

Variable	Protest	Rebellion	Intercommunal Conflict
Lag of dependent variables	0.457*** (0.036)	0.460*** (0.036)	0.431*** (0.032)
Parliamentary system	-0.086 (0.112)	0.262* (0.112)	0.079 (0.109)
Electoral System	-0.057* (0.036)	-0.099** (0.036)	-0.070# (0.038)
Decentralization	0.030 (0.023)	0.079*** (0.023)	0.075* (0.031)
Political Remedial Policy	0.146*** (0.037)	0.190*** (0.037)	0.021 (0.037)
Economic Remedial Policy	-0.081** (0.035)	-0.019 (0.035)	0.153*** (0.040)
Freedom House Score	0.060* (0.040)	-0.089* (0.040)	0.021 (0.037)
GDP per capita	0.001 (0.000)	-0.021*** (0.000)	-0.009 (0.000)
GDP growth rate	-0.003 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.005)
Political Difference	-0.004 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)
Economic differences	-0.003* (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)
Cultural differences	0.084** (0.038)	-0.012 (0.038)	0.065# (0.039)
Organizational cohesion	0.100***	0.084*** (0.021)	0.007 (0.019)
Constant	0.606*** (0.249)	-0.308 (0.249)	0.028 (0.242)
Rho	0.134	0.442	0.369
R ²	0.328	0.375	0.267
N	1501	1517	1537

#p ≤ 0.10 *p ≤ 0.05 **p ≤ 0.01 ***p ≤ 0.001

1. Democracy and ethnic conflicts

A conventional wisdom of ethnic conflict control is that a strong authoritarian state works better to control a segmented society and reduce ethnic conflict. Yet it seems not always true. The following tests reveal somewhat contradictory results: democracy/freedom reduce rebellion, but significantly boost the level of protest, and; there is no meaningful impact on intercommunal conflicts.

Using Polity III data, MAR III classifies regimes into four types: old democracy, new democracy, transitional polity, and autocracy. The indicator reflects the levels of democratic development and stability in 1998. Although it is a relatively simple test, table 2 shows interesting patterns between regime types and ethnic conflict. The table shows that whereas old and new democracies experienced more serious ethnic related protests, they suffered less significant rebellions. On the contrary, transitional polities and autocracies underwent more serious ethnic-related rebellions, but less critical protests than old and new democracies. Inter-communal conflict does not have any significant patterns.

Table 2: Democracy and Ethnic Conflicts

Regime Type		Protest	Rebellion	Intercommunal conflict
Old Democracy	Mean	1,918	0,940	1,126
	N	61	61	60
New Democracy	Mean	1,923	0,693	0,976
	N	62	63	64
Transitional Polity	Mean	1,400	0,984	1,018
	N	69	70	75
Autocracy	Mean	1,191	1,866	1,307
	N	57	58	64
Total	Mean	1,608	1,104	1,103
	N	249	252	263
Pearson Correlation Coefficient		-0.286***	0.178**	0.045
F-value		8.380***	4.829**	0.701

#p ≤ 0.1 *p ≤ 0.05 **p ≤ 0.01 ***p ≤ 0.001

Multivariate analyses conducted with different measurements confirm this result. The cross-sectional time series analyses in table 1 substitute Freedom House Score (FHS) for the regime types of Polity III data. It confirms the results of bivariate analysis. In table 1

FHS is positively related to protest and negatively to rebellion. The test results illustrate that the democracy or freedom as its substitute may open the space for ethnic related protests by giving incentives to ethnic elites. Note that the groups in this analysis are under risk situation as MAR III data defined. Thus the results do not mean democracy increases protest in its nature. As hypothesized (*Hypothesis 1*), democracy may contribute to reduce serious ethnic rebellion, or they do not enhance it, at least. These results coincide with Gurr's work,³⁰⁾ but they do not exactly confirm what Saideman and his colleagues found. Their work argues that both protests and rebellion are more likely in democracies than in authoritarian regimes because it is "easier to organize in more open societies.... [R]epression, which is more prevalent in nondemocracies... may actually succeed in preventing rebellious activity or raising its costs" (118). This sort of arguments focuses on ethnic outbidding dynamics, in which while democratic political elite cannot help pursuing more nationalistic goals, authoritarian elites do not need to appeal to larger audience. Though it is a plausible explanation for the levels of protest, the significance and nature of rebellion needs more careful explanation. Democratic polities allow their citizens certain levels of liberty to protest against government, but such liberty and stability of democratic politics can prevent those protests from developing to more serious rebellion. In other words, under democratic regimes the costs of protest are less than that of rebellion, compared to benefits that groups might perceive. In authoritarian polities, however, whereas protests are suppressed by regimes, rebellions are more vivid and serious because ethnic groups that fear another groups' domination do not have any exit except grabbing guns. Political elites in authoritarian regimes may know protest is not a possible option and even may be a risk one. Repression may succeed in preventing rebellion by raising cost for a while, but threshold also may not be high when the other options are blocked. Once ethnic elites successfully mobilize, the option has to be more violent ways.

2. Institutional Effects

The *Lijphart School* has clearly preferred parliamentarism to presidentialism because of its power-sharing nature, and many empirical studies have found robust empirical evidence to support it. However, the work of Saideman and his colleagues does not find any significant relationship between type of executive systems and ethnic conflicts. Parliamentary system does not contribute to remedying ethnic conflicts as significant as

30) Gurr (2000).

previous studies argued. Parliamentarism could be as dangerous as presidentialism because of the lack of strongly institutionalized leadership, the existence of multiple players and potential one-party dominance in both branches that disables check and balance.

Table 3: Comparisons of Mean Values (Three Political Institutions)

			Protest	Rebellion	Intercommunal Conflicts
Executive System	Presidential	Mean N	1,674 145	0,724 148	1,065 151
	Parliamentary	Mean N	1,896 62	1,067 63	1,097 65
	Total	Mean N	1,741 207	0,826 211	1,075 216
		t-value	-1,461	-1,453	-0,162
Electoral System	Plurality	Mean N	2,203 34	1,412 34	1,428 34
	Majority	Mean N	1,822 5	1,156 5	1 5
	Mixed	Mean N	1,801 24	0,644 25	0,688 26
	PR	Mean N	1,817 60	0,519 60	0,993 59
	Total	Mean N	1,921 123	0,815 124	1,048 124
		Coefficient ¹⁾	-0,168	-0,238**	-0,138
		F-value	1,402	2,494#	1,595
Centralization	Unitary	Mean N	1,885 87	0,726 88	0,894 88
	Federal	Mean N	2,006 36	1,031 36	1,426 36
	Total	Mean N	1,921 123	0,815 124	1,048 124
		t-value	-0,643	-0,957	-2,031*

#p ≤ 0.1 *p ≤ 0.05 **p ≤ 0.01 ***p ≤ 0.001 ¹⁾ Pearson Correlation Coefficient

The test results presented here provide a more pessimistic and complicated view about the superiority of parliamentary system than Saideman and others found. Bivariate

analysis in table 2 shows that presidential systems outperform the parliamentary systems in all of the three ethnic conflict dimensions. However, most of their differences are not statistically significant. In table 1 multivariate analyses present a more clear and detailed pattern. The table illustrates that although none of executive systems is clearly related to ethnic related protest and intercommunal conflict, yet the linkage between parliamentary system and higher ethnic related rebellion is statistically significant. In spite of slight differences among the tests, they show that parliamentary systems may not be a good choice for ethnically divided countries unlike previous theoretical studies has argued. The test result is only partially in the direction as hypothesized (Hypothesis 2) because any of the executive systems does not make any difference in ethnic protests. This result requires new and sophisticated theoretical developments as to why parliamentary systems cannot work as they were supposed to do.

Electoral systems are one of the major areas in political engineering. The choice of electoral systems has been widely discussed because its political implication goes beyond mechanical outcomes. Its significance comes from the fact that electoral systems are strongly influential on who governs and how political authority is distributed. Proportionality of electoral system has been the core issue especially dealing with ethnically segmented countries. Bivariate analyses in table 2 categorize four types of electoral systems according to their proportional nature: plurality, majority, mixed and PR systems. It has been persuasively believed that the degree of proportionality in an electoral system can reduce tensions between groups. Saideman and his colleagues also found that proportional democracy has positive effects to soothe ethnic conflict in both of protest and rebellion areas.³¹⁾ The test shows a slightly similar pattern with previous studies. The more proportional nature, the less ethnic conflicts engender though only relationship with rebellion is statistically significant. Multivariate analyses illustrate that in democratic countries, electoral systems with higher proportionality positively work in every dimensions of ethnic conflicts.

As hypothesized (Hypothesis 3-1), electoral systems with higher proportionality encourage the ethnic groups to participate in an institutionalized political arena. Once their representations are made, the groups are endowed with political responsibility in addition to political rights. Sharing responsibility may reduce elites' appeal to violent methods to achieve goals of their ethnic groups at least in certain level. But it does not mean that ethnic cleavages in politics become blunted. Proportional representation may

31) Saideman et al., (2002).

provide outbidding opportunities to ethnic entrepreneurs over moderates within their groups. However, these test results suggest that in general, by entailing and preserving ethnically segmented electoral politics, PR system can alleviate violent ethnic conflicts.

Federal systems are one solution that both democracies and non-democracies can accept to remedy ethnic problems. Allowing autonomous power to locales, centrifugal authorities are able to entail spaces and chances in which minorities are able to participate and be represented. Table 3 highlights the different levels of ethnic conflicts between federal and non-federal (unitary) systems. Federal systems are linked with higher levels of ethnic conflicts although only the relationship with intercommunal conflicts is statistically significant. However, simple dichotomous divisions between federal and unitary system do not precisely represent levels of centrifugal political power. An alternative way measuring centralization is to consider how local governments are composed, and how much authority they have distributed. In multivariate analyses, a decentralization index composed of 5 indicators of DPI is employed. Cross sectional time series analyses in table 1 indicate that more decentralization exacerbates rebellion and intercommunal conflicts. These are somewhat complicated and contradictory results compared with above bivariate test, however; in general, one may say that decentralization tends to aggravate ethnic conflicts. But in case of rebellion in especially non-democratic countries, decentralization effects are not like what is shown in table 7.³²⁾

These could be very disheartening results to advocates of power-sharing institutions. Hypothesis 4 is not proved. However the results confirm that no grand theory is practically applicable to all real political areas. Decentralization has not only power sharing but also power dividing nature. It may broaden the possibility of ethnic discord by preserving ethnic identities and autonomy, which ironically but logically energizes ethnic grievances and mobilizes them as a meaningful political force. Theoretically decentralization might be the very best solution to ethnic conflicts, but sometimes its application is often out of accordance with political circumstances and other conditions.

The final institutions examined are preferential or remedial policies. These are not exactly political institutions that decide rules of game, but they often partially regulate

32) To examine the effects of decentralization in non-democratic regimes, another cross sectional time series analysis was conducted, but unfortunately, no significant relationship was detected. By changing federal system variable to index of decentralization, what Saideman et al. (2002) argued was not confirmed.

the functions and operations of the institutions. Furthermore, since policies aim to not only political elites but also mass public, their effects on ethnic conflict cannot be ignored. However, preferential policies are not automatically positive solutions for ethnic conflicts. Like other political institutions, sometimes, they can spark new tensions between ethnic groups if certain groups feel that remedial policies are different types of discrimination to their interests. In the present analysis, the effects of political and economic remedial policies are explored.

Table 4: Preferential Policies and Ethnic Conflicts (ANOVA)

		Protest	Rebellion	Intercommunal Conflicts
Preferential Policy	Political ¹⁾	0.141*	0.176*	0.088
	Economic ¹⁾	0.132*	0.126*	0.142*

#p ≤ 0.1 *p ≤ 0.05 **p ≤ 0.01 ***p ≤ 0.001 ¹⁾ Pearson Correlation Coefficient

Table 4 illustrates that in general both policies have positive relationships with the three dimensions of ethnic conflicts. (Note that lower values for variables are better and more remedial policies) But multivariate analysis in table 1 demonstrates more detailed patterns. In the area of ethnic protest, whereas political remedial policy brings positive results, economic remedial policy negatively intensifies protests. In terms of rebellion behaviors, only political remedial policy has positive effects. In terms of intercommunal conflicts, only economic remedial policy positively functions. In sum, political remedial policy works positively in three areas if marginal in the area of rebellion, but economic remedial policy increases intercommunal conflict, but decreases protest. Its impact on rebellion is not statistically significant.

3. Other variables

Three different groups of control variables are examined. First, GDP per capita is clearly related to ethnic related rebellion. The higher GDP per capita, the less rebellion are expected and it is not a surprising result. But its relationship with protest is not exposed through tests in our analysis. It could be presumed that like democracy, the level of GDP per capita may change the rationale of behavior. For people with higher income, rebellions cost too much compared what they earn from those behaviors. For people with lower income, it works exactly the opposite way. GDP growth rate does not much meaningful result.

Secondly, three group differences are explored. Unlike common sense group differences do not seem critical reasons causing ethnic conflicts. The test results show that even economic differences decrease protest slightly. But cultural differences increases protest behaviors, but their relationship with rebellion is not statistically significant. Political and economic differences may deplete resources to mobilize and organize protest, which is quite plausible. But the logic is not certain from this finding, but one may say there is no linear relationship between political differences and ethnic conflicts. Political differences may have people, whose access to less violent behaviors is blockaded, directly appeal to more violent behaviors when their endurance crosses certain threshold. More research is needed on this point.

Finally, group's organization cohesion is examined. This variable shows how ethnic cleavage is transformed into politics. The finding is crucially interesting; except intercommunal conflicts, multivariate analysis shows that strong organizational cohesion significantly increases ethnic related protest and rebellion. In other words, if a group is dominantly represented by ethnic parties and organizations, the group is more likely to confront ethnic related conflicts than other groups that are dispersedly represented by umbrella organizations or catch all parties. It is an expected result since such politics provides apposite circumstances in which ethnic outbidding easily occurs as rational choice school implied. Ethnic elites do not need to appeal to the population outside of their own groups, which is actually impossible in such ethnically divided politics. By criticizing and condemning other groups, hardliners manipulate crises between ethnic groups and pursue their won interests. Unlike hypothesized (Hypothesis 3-2) group cohesiveness does not disarm the effects of PR system among democracies.

Above the results convey two critical implications. (1) If a group is represented only one ethnic organization or party, their minimum representation should be guaranteed. If the organization or party is not represented, at least, as much as their share of population, chances of ethnic conflicts culminate. Thus, consociational solution should be applied. (2) The result also implies that the politics compatible with crosscutting organizations among ethnic groups provides much easier circumstances to control ethnic problems. In this case, integrative/consensus approach should be an appropriate solution. Yet it does not mean consensus democracy and institutions that bring it out are more superior to or always desirable than consociational democracy. Rather, it insinuates that choices of institutions as solutions and their ultimate tasks should hinge on those political situations about how group's organizational cohesion has been structured.³³⁾

33) While initial political circumstances influence the choice of institutions, institutions themselves also contribute to construct certain political circumstances. However, political

VII. Conclusion

What the analysis finds here are institutions do matter in solving ethnic problems but their effects and functions are not exactly corresponding to what many previous theoretical studies have expected. Indeed, there are only a few empirical cross sectional analyses exploring the effects of institutions on ethnic conflicts, excepting the recent article of Saideman and his colleagues. Therefore, one of the important tasks of this study is to empirically test the hypotheses that result from the voluminous previous literature that suggests many ideas of institutional solution to ethnic conflicts. Through this analysis whereas some of hypotheses are proven as expected, some others are rejected or even undetermined.

Perhaps the most important finding of this empirical analysis is that power-sharing institutions do not always positively work on resolving ethnic strife as the previous studies expected. The effects are different according to the types of institutions. It is truly noticeable that parliamentary systems are outperformed by presidential systems in terms of rebellion index. Not many empirical studies in other policy areas have supported superiority of presidentialism to parliamentarism. Although federalism is more positively inclined to ethnic peace than unitary system, more complicated indicators of decentralization contradictorily seem to boost ethnic conflicts. But PR systems are always better choice than plurality or other majoritarian system as hypothesized. The effects of democracy and institutions are embodied in different manners according to dimensions and kinds of ethnic conflicts. Democracy definitely reduces violent rebellions, but they are prone to enhance protests. Parliamentary system in terms of ethnic protest is not as dangerous as it is in ethnic rebellion. Politically remedial policies alleviate ethnic conflicts, but the effects of economically remedial policies are not significant.

These results do not degrade previous theoretical development, however: arguments of grand theories need to be revised. Depending on areas to which institutional solutions and policies are applied, mechanical effects of political institutions engender different political outcomes.³⁴⁾ Actually these results enrich and refine existing theories. It also implies that real application of institutional engineering in real politics is very complicated work. Although the idea of power based on *sharing* is shining wisdom about gentle humanity, it has not been always praised. Most critics and even advocates of

cleavage usually preexists before institutional choices are made.


34) Jae-Woo Hong and K.C. Morrison, "Institutional Impact on Democratic Governance," paper presented at 60th Annual Conference of Midwest Political Science Association, (2002).

power sharing agree that the application of power sharing politics needs great sensitivity, insight, and care. Despite its good intention, power-sharing systems, especially consociational system, can backfire, and they possibly cause even serious ethnic conflicts. For example, PR systems designed to encourage minority representation may stiffen voters' choice, and minorities will remain in eternal minority status. Since share of election results are almost fixed, extremists feel no need to compete with other parties, rather: they only seek to outbid modest centralists in their own groups by appealing to primordial identities which tend to be hostile to other groups. Federalism or autonomous ethnic territories can make problems because delineating ethnic boundaries are not easy tasks and may entail another ethnic crisis. Hence, arguing for the need of external intervention, some scholars devaluate power sharing as conflict management, not conflict resolution.³⁵⁾




Positive expectation for democracy and power-sharing institutions is still going on, however. In spite of those possible problems, designing appropriate institutions for power sharing and implementing their functions and practical applications are only peaceful and available solutions in long run. External intervention may provide effective short-term prescription stopping blood-bathing genocide and preventing local anarchy. Yet it also has problems. Most participants of external intervention tend to have their own goals and interests, which do not always correspond to people's interests in intervened countries. If external forces have no sufficient interests or domestic support to keep their intervention, they simply leave or abandon their responsibility as seen in Somalia. The effectiveness of external intervention comes from the power that can completely incapacitate warring groups or bring them to bargaining tables. Except clear and peaceful separation into independent countries, which is not likely to happen, bargaining should be about new institutional arrangement of power and authority. Therefore, in the long term, the institutional approach is the only available and thinkable alternative to ethnic conflicts.

This study, however, still requires further studies for some limitations that it bears. First, there needs research based on new and expended dataset. In spite of its wide utilities, MAR dataset has significant limitation for institutional studies. The dataset does not include the societies that are ethnically divided, but peacefully managed. The dataset covers only ethnic groups in certain risky situations. This fact could seriously threaten the possibility of comparison among institutional effects since successful cases were already excluded. Second, analyses exploring empirical differences between

35) Lake and Rothchild (1996).



consociational/communalist and consensus/integrative democracies have to be added. The present analysis reveals only the importance of group's organizational cohesion that reflects the structure of ethnic politics. Thus, based on this finding, the new research should examine which institutions successfully control and manage certain political structures, especially, ethnically centrifugal or centripetal voting alignments.




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