

A Neo-Classical Realist Account on External Security Behaviors of Weak Power towards Great Power :

The US-Libya from 1977 to 1992*

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· **Keyword:** Weak Power, Great Power, Asymmetrical Relations, Regime Security, Defy, Accommodate, Bargain, Neo-Classical Realism.

【ABSTRACT】

This paper seeks to propose a way to theorize Weak Power's varied strategies towards Great Power in an asymmetric relationship by using Neo-Classical Realist frameworks. I demonstrate how we should go about linking a domestic variable, which is regime security, with such key external variables as alliance availability and threat levels. The article presents three variances in Weak Power's behaviors towards Great Powers, which are Defy, Accommodate and Bargain. The paper purports to show the importance of domestic political variables in explaining state behaviors. The paper examines the U.S.-Libyan cases and explains how and why Libya was able to show various foreign policy behaviors towards the US.

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I . Introduction

Thucydides characterized world politics by saying, “The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.”¹⁾ The distribution of power in international politics, to an important degree, determines the fate of a state, as neorealists would argue.²⁾ In political realism as a philosophy, survival is the virtue and its means must subsume violence: “necessity and reason of state trump morality and ethics”³⁾ in the world of “a war of every man against every man.”⁴⁾ The expected behavior of a Weak Power⁵⁾ at the system level is, rather, blended into the politics of Great Powers, which pitches a stark and simple projection of a Weak Power’s behavior vis-à-vis a Great Power, as the function of the distribution of power.⁶⁾ Weak Powers make themselves subordinate and subservient to Great Powers in order to lengthen their survival and maximize profits in the anarchistic world politics.⁷⁾ Jack Snyder notes that Weak Powers “are more exposed to the vagaries of international security and economic competition” and “adapt their domestic politic circumstances to the strategy that their foreign environment dictates”⁸⁾

1) Robert B. Strasser, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comparative Guide to the Peloponnesian War* (New York: Free Press, 1966), p.5.

2) Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979).

3) Randall Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism” in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman eds. *Progress in International Politics: Appraising the Field* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), p.323.

4) Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.76.

5) A Weak Power will be defined as a state whose security is dependent on external assistance because of its inadequate material capability, while its internal security is vulnerable due to the lack of political institutionalism. In this paper, Weak Powers are mostly third world and developing states. For a similar definition of Weak Power, see Robert Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbus University Press, 1968), p.229.

6) Hans Morgenthau also presents that Weak Power in the balance of power system must look for external assistance for its survival, “*The small nation look for the protection of its rights to the assistance of powerful friends which can marshal superior power in order to oppose an attempt at infringement with a change of success*” in *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p.229. Some scholars argue that Weak State would bandwagon in conflictual asymmetric relations. See Annette Baker Fox, *The Power of Small States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Michael I. Handel, *Weak States in the International System* (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1981), pp.45~46; David Vital, *The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967); Robert Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,” *International Organization*, 23:2 (Spring 1969); Annette Baker Fox, “The Small States in the International System, 1919–1969,” *International Journal*, 24:4 (1969), pp.751–764.

7) For a similar argument, see Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1962), p.13.

8) Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp.317~318.

Schweller also implies in a similar manner that extreme systemic constraints can explain Weak Power's foreign policy and military behavior.⁹⁾ Stephen Walt has refined the balance of power theory into the balance of threat theory in which states align based on threat perception, not solely in response to the distribution of power.¹⁰⁾ He argues that Weak Powers would bandwagon with the source of threat for "accommodating a neighboring Great Power may occasionally make more sense"¹¹⁾ and bandwagoning "may be adopted as a form of appeasement"¹²⁾ if it "sees no possibility of external assistance, accommodation through alignment with the threatening power may be chosen as a last resort."¹³⁾ Thus, a general view, if not consensus, is that the weight of anarchy overwhelms that of domestic factors in terms of the system level behavior of a Weak Power. However, we do not observe many uniform behaviors in Weak Powers in world politics. Some actually choose to suffer by directly confronting Great Powers. As Robert Jervis rightly observes:

it [neorealism] underestimates the power and autonomy of even weak states... Underdeveloped countries do not follow the same policies or develop the same internal structures. Some seek integrated, although not necessarily compliant, role in the international capitalist system (the NICs), others break away by revolution (Cuba), still others isolate themselves (Myanmar). That a high price may be paid for the latter choices does not mean that states cannot and have not made them.¹⁴⁾

In the contemporary US-led unipolar moment, North Korea has effectively and continuously played a strategy of diplomatic brinkmanship vis-à-vis the US since the end of the Cold War. How can we explain the North Korean problem that is a Weak Power seeking to maximize its national security by proactively creating crises against the unipolar power? Moreover, why did Saddam Hussein's Iraq resist the US knowing

9) Randall Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" *World Politics*, 44:2 (January, 1992), p.267.

10) Stephen M. Walt, *the Origin of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); "Alliance Formation and Balance of World Power," in Michale E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller eds, *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), pp.208~248; "Alliances, Threats and US Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs," *Security Studies*, Vol.1, No.3, (Spring 1992), pp.448~482.

11) Walt, "Alliance Formation and Balance of World Power." p.223.

12) Walt, *ibid.*, pp.212~213.

13) Walt, *ibid.*, p.222 .

14) Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p.103.

that its failure to surrender would result in not only the demise of his regime but also his life? On the other hand, despite the strong anti-American sentiment and domestically strong support for the fundamental Islamic movement in Pakistan, why did Musharraf make a 180-degree maneuver in the aftermath of 9.11 and accommodate the US demand to collaborate? In essence, how can we better explain Weak Powers' various and seemingly deviant behaviors in their asymmetric and oftentimes threatening relations with a Great Power? Why do Weak Powers generate different behaviors vis-à-vis a threatening Great Power? What IR theories can be applied to explain these variances in Weak Power's strategic behaviors vis-à-vis threatening Great Powers? What other variables should we bring in to acquire better understanding of these states' external behaviors?

One way to answer these questions is through a synthesis of the domestic and international systemic factors which clearly enables researchers to aggregate the units and enhances our understanding of external behaviors of state in international system. The state-centric level of analysis (the second image) produces richer descriptions and causal explanations for the origins of state behaviors, while the systemic / holistic level (the third image) is better at providing broader generalizations about how the nation-states normally behave within international system.¹⁵⁾ Morton Kaplan, for example, makes claims that the international system and certain characteristics of the actor's internal system can specify the main outlines of state behavior in world politics.¹⁶⁾ Political scientists interested in linking systemic- and domestic-level theorizing persuasively justify combining these two, and make numerous efforts to construct the best ways to do it.¹⁷⁾

Although the acceptance of domestic variables as explanatory variables has been accepted as a quasi consensus, the ways to get at it have been very murky and less systematic. In Sterling-Folker's words, little effort has been made for exploring "the theoretical basis upon which such a combination could take place or whether it is possible in anything but the most ad hoc manner."¹⁸⁾ In this vein, I advocate a neoclassical realist approach that employs a crossover of the levels of analysis in which

15) J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," *World Politics* 14:1 (October 1961), pp.77-92.

16) Morton Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1957), pp.1-85.

17) James N. Rosenau, *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems* (Now York: the Free Press, 1969); Peter B Evans et al., *Double Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1993).

18) Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic Variables" *International Security* 41:1 (March, 1997), p.2.

interactive dynamics within world politics function as the independent variable while the domestic politics as the intervening variable.

My research puzzles also bring more perspective-diversity in realism by bringing Weak Power's perspectives. As a result of Great Power-centered international politics, a great deal of the IR literature on Weak Powers (i.e., Third World states and developing countries) has been written from the perspectives of Great Power competition in the strategic regions of their interest. Little has been written in a systematic fashion about Weak Powers' foreign policy by reversing from Great Power perspectives to Weak Power perspectives, which integrates Weak Power's external security environment with its internal factors.¹⁹⁾

In this vein, I argue that Weak Power's internal politics, especially its regime security, may become a critical predictor of its external security strategies due to its less institutionalized nature of domestic politics. Precisely, this research presents a systematic model that explains behaviors of Weak Powers by integrating the systemic factors – (1) the level of external threat and (2) the availability of external alliance – as independent variables, with the domestic variable – (3) the regime security of a Weak Power – as an intervening variable. By inserting the domestic variable, I want to explore Weak Power's behaviors such as defying, accommodating and bargaining with Great Powers through a neoclassical realist framework in terms of uncovering its motivations by linking external and internal variables. The main hypothesis is such that if the regime of the Weak Power is stable, then we should expect weak power's strategies that are consistent with the expectations of neorealism, and on the other hand, if regime security is shaky, that is unstable, we should expect to observe a Weak Power's strategies that would be considered by neorealism to be either irrational or doomed to fail.²⁰⁾

This paper consists of two sections – a theoretical section followed by an empirical case study. In the theoretical part, I will present a neoclassical realist model integrating the external security environment with the domestic regime security of Weak Powers after a series of deductive reasoning backed up with detailed literature reviews. In the empirical section, four longitudinal cases of Libya from 1977 to 1992 will be analyzed specially in

19) An exception can be made to Stephen Walt, "Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition" in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder eds. *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rim land* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.51~84.

20) These irrational strategies would entail the failure to form effective balancing or bandwagoning alliances in the midst of external threat or directly confront the threatening power although its overall capacity is inferior to its threatening power.

the domain of the US–Libya relations.

II. Extant Scholarship dealing with domestic politics and behaviors of Weak Powers

There exist a handful number of literatures that explicitly deal with peripheral states' foreign policy behaviors.²¹⁾ They accept the traditional arguments of diversionary war theories made by Quincy Wright, Richard Rosecrance and Earnst Haas. Quincy Wright mentioned the possibility of linkage between conflict occurring in the domestic and foreign spheres.²²⁾ Rosecrance presented the existence of correlation between international instability and domestic insecurity of elites.²³⁾ Haas also argued, "In terms of extreme domestic tensions among elites, a policy of uniting a badly divided nation against some real or alleged outside threat frequently seems useful to a ruling group."²⁴⁾

The literature of Third World states' security behavior commonly places an important emphasis on the domestic political causes of Third World states' behavior, as the intervening filter. Rothstein becomes puzzled with the policy imperative induced by the balance of power systems that actors could only ignore at their own perils, and then asks a question, "[But] if a statesman is limited in the directions he can draw from systemic patterns, what landmarks do in fact serve to orient his behavior?" This brings in a realistic dimension asking the perspectives of Weak Power leaders whose perceptions are based on "the characteristics of the present configuration, which are both salient and relevant to the immediate situation within a context which is local, as hoc and parochial, not systemic."²⁵⁾ Rothstein further develops this notion that foreign policy in developing states generally serves crucial domestic political purposes ranging from economic nationalism, anti-colonialism, non-alignment to national pride, which all contribute to creating a degree of identity with the nation and the sense of unity.²⁶⁾

21) Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon eds., *National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats* (College Park, MD: CIDCM, University of Maryland, 1988).

22) Quincy Wright, *A Study Of War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 1942).

23) Richard N. Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1963), p.185.

24) Earnst B. Haas and Allen Whiting, *Dynamics of International Relations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), p.62.

25) Robert Rothstein, "Alignment, Nonalignment, and Small Powers: 1945–1965" *International Organization*, 20:3 (Summer, 1966), p.399.

Rothstein is correct to point out, “Domestic instability, or the fear of it, tempts insecure leaders to use foreign policy as a supplementary resource in their political struggles. A rising defense budget, or efforts to secure high levels of military assistance, may be a way to keep the army happy.”²⁷⁾ In a similar fashion, Michael Mastanduno et al. present a theoretical framework which contains many sets of hypotheses about the linkage effect between international factors and domestic factors proposing a conception of the domestic strategies for the pursuit of international goals vs. international strategies for the pursuit of domestic goals.²⁸⁾

Steven David systematically strengthens Rothstein and Mastanduno et al’s arguments by presenting the concept of *omnibalancing*, based on the assumption that leaders in the Third World need to counter all threats domestically and externally.²⁹⁾ Omnibalancing is strategic calculation by leaders for deciding alignment behaviors as not only a function of the international politics but also of the domestic politics. David emphasizes “the rational calculation of Third World leaders as to which outside power is most likely to do what is necessary to keep them in power.”³⁰⁾ The lack of political institutions that guarantees Third World leaders an end to their political tenure make them act differently from First World leaders.

Barnett and Levy blend the question of alliance with an approach of the international political economy and examine the domestic sources of international alignment and alliances, particularly the impact of the domestic political economy on state trade-offs between alliances and internal mobilization as alternative means for enhancing security.³¹⁾ They explore two important and related arguments, which focus on domestic political dynamics, and more precisely regime security. Firstly, domestic political and economic constraints may limit a state’s ability to mobilize internal resources for external security without adversely affecting the domestic political interests of the elite in power and this may provide powerful incentives for leaders to prefer external alignments to internal mobilization as a strategy to provide for their security in the face of external threats. Secondly, internal threats to government rule provide additional

26) Robert Rothstein, “Foreign Policy and Development Policy: From Nonalignment to International Class War.” *International Affairs*, 52:4 (Oct, 1976), pp.596–616.

27) Rothstein, *ibid.*, pp.602~3.

28) Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake and G. John Ikenberry, “Toward a realist theory of state action” *International Security Quarterly*, 33:4 (Dec., 1989), pp.457–474.

29) Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” *World Politics*, 43:2 (Jan., 1991), pp.233–256.

30) Steven R. David, *ibid.*, p.235.

31) Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Source of Alliances and Alignment: The Case of Egypt, 1962–73.” *International Organization* 45:3 (Summer 1991), pp.369–395.

incentives for state leaders to seek an external alliance, for they might secure material resources that can then be used to counter domestic threats to the regime.

The literatures reviewed present a challenging but valuable view; the importance of domestic factors in accounting for Weak Powers' foreign policy is an empirical question and should not be assumed as *a priori*. This is a challenging view to the conventional wisdom in the field, which argues for less relevance of domestic factors in accounting for Weak Power's foreign policy. But the fact that these views, except Barnett and Levy, lack empirical testing has motivated this study to construct a model that introduces a domestic political variable as the intervening variable, while accepting as an axiom their emphasis on the characteristics of domestic politics in the third world states. Moreover, they seem to lack a systematic incorporation of domestic political variables with external variables and fail to construct a model of how these external and internal variables are interacting.

III. Domestic Politics and Neoclassical Realism

How can a systematic incorporation of domestic variables in Weak Powers with the external variables be achieved? In this study I advocate a neo-classical realist approach. Structural realism has certainly contributed to explaining and understanding international politics. Waltzian neorealism has brought about the salience of anarchy as "the scope condition"³²⁾ or "the outer-environment"³³⁾ that constrain states' external behaviors and inter-state interactions in international politics. The distribution of power structure constitutes the reward-punishment structure in a self-help system. Waltz is explicit on this point noting that "Because states coexist in a self-help system, they are free to do any fool thing they care to, but they are likely to be rewarded for behavior that is response to structural pressures and punished for behavior that is not."³⁴⁾

Therefore, I accept the scope condition of neorealism, anarchy, and its external stimulus as the influential explanatory variable to understanding states' external behaviors. The system theory is still important because, without it, we cannot be sure whether, or under what circumstances, or for what types of behavior, sub-systemic

32) Davis B. Bobrow, *International Relations: New Approaches* (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p.15.

33) Herbert A. Simon, *The Science of the Artificial* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), Ch.4.

34) Kenneth Waltz, "Evaluating Theories" *American Political Science Review*, Vol.91(4) (Dec., 1997), p.915.

factors affect state behaviors. But I problematize neorealism in which the autonomy and internal dynamics of states are downplayed, as it is too ignorant in its view of the degree to which external forces control the fate of states. A purely materialist version of realism that hinges solely on the distribution of power at the system level cannot adequately explain variations in Weak Power behavior.

In this vein, neoclassical realism is a valuable approach to improving our understanding of international relations in general and external behaviors of Weak Powers in particular. Neoclassical realists try to “specify the hypothesized linkage between purported systemic-level cause and the alleged unit-level responses to such external stimuli” and provide explanations for “why different states, or the same state at different historical moments have different intentions, goals, and preferences toward the outside world.”³⁵⁾

Neoclassical realism is a theory of foreign policy that highlights security problems from the perspective of actors who aspire to adopt and adapt to security challenges for not only the national security sake but also for their own political advantages (i.e., survival). It bases its analysis on realistic observation of real politics subsuming complex interactions within analytically manageable fashions by making causal arguments between domestic and international factors and policy challenges. It realizes that the actual decision of a particular strategy through adaptation and implementation of it must be deciphered through domestic political considerations.³⁶⁾

Neoclassical realism asserts the intervening variables such as perceptions of leaders³⁷⁾ and the strength of state apparatus and its relation to society,³⁸⁾ while taking the distribution of power in international politics as the independent variable. Therefore, in this study, the domestic variables are theorized as the filtering process by contending that the impact of relative power of states in world politics on formulating actual foreign policy is indirect and complex. Thus, this paper adapts the tradition of neoclassical realism that has ventured to identify transmissive paths between the systemic factors

35) Schweller, “Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,” p.321.

36) Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policies” *World Politics*, vol.51 (1), (October, 1988), p.146.

37) William C. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Power Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Randall Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

38) Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: the Unusual Origins of American’s World Role* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

and the domestic factors in explaining states' foreign policy behaviors, by "updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realism"³⁹⁾ and for "refining, not refuting"⁴⁰⁾ neorealism.

IV. Regime Security and Weak Power's Security Strategy

I introduce the conception of domestic political regime security as an intervening variable and test how the domestic political dynamics of Weak Powers affect Weak Powers' external behaviors during conflictual asymmetrical situations.⁴¹⁾ One must wonder why regime security, not the regime type, functions as the intervening variable. Despite quantitative researches on the linkage between regime type and external conflict behavior, we still do not have conclusive evidence whether or not these two are directly and causally linked to each other.⁴²⁾ And yet, they merely provide the propensity of institutional attributes that may influence the state's action and reaction in generating external behaviors. However, by positing the concept of regime security, I argue "the content of politics" very sensitive to regime security may produce more satisfying causal arguments in explaining external behaviors of weak powers, more specifically Third World states. Azar and Moon are insightful in pointing out, "National security performance may be enhanced more by 'benevolent' dictatorship with high legitimacy than by the fragile and incompetent pluralist regime with low legitimacy"⁴³⁾ I suspect that regime security matters more in politically unstable or oppressed states, and essentially intervenes to produce external strategies of a Weak Power in time of external security problem when a Great Power imposes either low or high threat. Michael Barnett and Jack Levy are correct to point out that "state survival is rarely at stake while regime stability or survival frequently is, because state decision makers generally attend

39) Gideon Rose, *ibid.*, p.146.

40) Randall L. Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition" *American Political Science Review*, Vol.91(4) (Dec., 1997), pp.927-930.

41) Azar and Moon eds., *ibid.*; Stephen D. Krasner, *Structural Conflict: Third World Against the Global Liberalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

42) Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1946-1986" *American Political Science Review* Vol.87 (1999), pp.624-638; David Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi and Paul K Huth, "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-1988," *American Political Science Review* 90:3 (September, 1996), pp.512-533; William Reed, "A Unified Statistical Model of Conflict Onset and Escalation" *American Journal of Political Science*, 44:1 (2000), pp.84-93.

43) Azar and Moon, "Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The Software Side of Third World National Security" *ibid.*, p.81.

to immediate threats first, and because their risk orientations toward threat involving high values but low probabilities vary considerably.”⁴⁴⁾

Conceptually, the domestic political regime is to be linked with the strength of political leadership (i.e., cohesiveness) and legitimacy (i.e., acceptance of authority). Regime legitimacy is established if wide agreement exists in society that has a right to hold a power and is derived from a variety of sources, including the claim of a divine mandate, revolutionary heritage, nationalism, charismatic authority and democratic consensus. Failure to meet not only the basic needs of the people but also its previous political platform to gain power can be a determinant of the security of a political regime. And the durability of the political regime may get ‘shakier.’ Thus, chronic crisis within the regime and resulting social and political challenges to the regime, overtly or covertly, can alter the overall security calculation by leaders in power, which may either externalize the internal stress or internalize external stress for the purpose of maintaining the regime security. For example, the domestic regime of a Weak Power must either reconcile the external security environment with the domestic political reaction to it, or overrule domestic political reactions and pursue rational policy options dictated by the constraints of the external security environment. Especially when directly confronted with a Great Power, a Weak Power’s domestic factors can be complicated by nationalism, cultural factors, ideology, religions and history. Thus, the cumulative dynamics of the domestic regime security (i.e., political legitimacy, internal threat and leadership cohesiveness) will function as a conversion mechanism that determines the behavior of a Weak Power in a asymmetrical conflictual setting.⁴⁵⁾ If bandwagoning with a threatening Great Power is contradictory to its political and nationalistic platform, then its resulting political legitimacy will erode and internal challenge will rise. On the other hand, a Weak Power often provokes foreign conflict and attempt to strengthen its regime security by an appeal to nationalism; amplification of external threats and the regime’s political intention to increase its internal security may motivate Weak Power’s conflictual behavior during an asymmetrical conflict. Perpetual legitimacy crises and resulting regime insecurity may cause ruling elites to equate regime security with national security. This theoretical intuition is empirically supported by a cross-national analysis of the post-1953 era, which found a strong relationship between both protest and government repression and international conflicts.⁴⁶⁾

44) Barnett and Levy, *ibid.*, p.373.


45) Azar and Moon, *ibid.*, pp.78~79.

46) Bruce Russett, “Economic Decline, Electoral Pressure, and the Initiation of Interstate Conflict”

What this implies is theoretically clear; the ruling elites' interest in aspiring for power may generate a new set of external behaviors. Weak Powers' concern with internal security may motivate them to choose external security strategies that may be perceived irrational in the neorealist perspective. Leadership with the problem of regime security may not give the highest priority to state security in calculation of foreign policy decision-making even in times of crisis. As theories of diversionary war argues, states going through political turmoil may be more likely to engage in foreign conflict and maximize its opportunity for reviving its internal security.⁴⁷

I present a model in which the three factors – the level of external threat, alliance availability and the internal regime security will determine external security strategies by the regime of Weak Power, which are (1) accommodate, (2) bargain, and (3) defy in order to ensure its security in a conflictual situation with Strong Power.

〈Figure 1〉 Weak Power's External Security Strategies



1. Variables: External Threat, Availability of Alliance and Regime Security

Since the domain of observation is asymmetrical conflicts, I use threat from a Great Power as one of two independent variables. Moreover, I accommodate the balance of threat theory by Stephan Walt where threat is operationalized as the major source of state's external behavior at system level. Weak Power is existentially sensitive and vulnerable to external threats due to its low defensive capability. An imbalance of threat

in C. Gochman and A.N. Sabrosky eds, *Prisoners of War?: Nation states in the modern era* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1989).

47) Jack Levy, "the Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique" in Manus I. Midlarsky eds, *Handbook of War Studies* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1989), pp.259~288.

perceived by a Weak Power is the systemic driver for the Weak State either to balance against or bandwagon with the source of threat. In my model, I operationalize the level of threat imposed by Great Power into two levels— high and low(See Table 1). If a Great Power directly and coercively threatens a Weak Power’s security, theoretically at least according to the balance of power theory, it may have to accommodate the demands of Great Powers unless it decides to fight and, possibly die out.⁴⁸⁾ On the other hand, if the threat is conceived low, then a Weak Power will try to seek other ways to manipulate the situation.

The second independent variable is the availability of alliance. I use the term – alliance in its broadest sense to refer to a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between a Weak Power and a potential ally other than the threatening Great Power⁴⁹⁾ and look at other Great Powers that may assist the Weak Power. The Weak Power’s external security environment is complicated by availability of external assistance, especially at the time of external security crisis. Therefore, Weak Power’s sensitivity to external threat is diminished by availability of an international ally. Alliance availability provides the Weak Power’s expectation regarding political–military support from its potential allies as well as additional ranges of strategic options between bandwagoning and balancing in confrontation with the Great Power. The existence of the Great Powers’ rivalry structure may generate subsequent uncertainty in the security of Great Powers.⁵⁰⁾ Such competition often works in favor of the Weak Power, which, “if they are free to offer their alliance, can raise their price and ask the great powers for more support.”⁵¹⁾ If outside help were available, then the Weak Power would have more options to maximize its goals, it can defy, negotiate or bandwagon.⁵²⁾

The conception of political regime is narrowly defined as a group of ruling coalitions whose best political interest is to maintain its continued incumbency as the executive branch of government in the state.⁵³⁾ I operationalize regime security as cohesiveness of the incumbent leadership and its control in domestic politics. The cumulative dynamics of the domestic regime security, internal threat and leadership cohesiveness will

48) T.V Paul, *Asymmetric Conflict: War Initiation by Weaker Powers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

49) I accommodate Stephan Walt’s use of alliance as “a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.” See Walt, *The Origin of Alliances*, p.12.

50) Waltz writes, “In a bipolar world there are no peripheries. With only two powers capable of acting on a world scale, anything that happens anywhere is potentially of concern to both of them.” See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p.171.

51) Handel, *ibid.*, p.181.

52) David, *ibid.*, pp.238~242.

53) David Easton, *A System Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965), p.103.

function as a conversion mechanism that determines the strategy of a Weak Power.⁵⁴⁾ The incumbent regime of a Weak Power must either reconcile the international systemic influence and the domestic political reaction to it, or overrule the domestic political reaction and pursue rational policy options dictated by the international systemic constraints. Table 1 presents operational definitions of the variables.

〈Table 1〉 Operational Definition of Variables

| Independent Variables: External Security Environment | | Intervening Variable |
|---|--|---|
| External Threat | Alliance Availability | Regime Security |
| High level → Actual implementation of Great Power's direct punishment to Weak Powers through military operations or economic sanctionElites. | Available → Cooperative relationship with other Great Power willing to offer military and economic assistance; formal or informal agreement. | Solid → Internal threats do not exist; absence of attempted coups and collective revolts by political dissidents; the leadership is cohesive. |
| Low level → Diplomatic pressure such as terminating diplomatic relations, expelling diplomatic corps and halting bilateral economic projects. | Not Available → Absence of other Great Powers willing to offer assistance. | Shaky → Internal threats to the political leadership; presence of coups and direct challenges to the leadership. |

2. Weak Power's Security Strategies

A Weak Power's external strategies are of three types—accommodate, bargain and defy. Conceptualization and operationalization of each typology are as following.

Accommodate

Weak Power can capitulate the threat or demand of a Great Power. In this case, the level of threat from the Great Power may be directly and coercively targeted to the survival of the Weak Power. Thus, to Weak Power, capitulation is solely a defensive foreign policy decision intended to secure its national security. Accommodation may take place in the forms of diplomatic endorsement, unconditional concession to Great Power's threat or specific demand or bandwagoning with the source of threat.

Bargain

Weak Power may actively bargain with Great Power by setting agendas and terms of negotiations through peaceful means for side payments or payoffs. This may bring a peaceful resolution that does not involve any conflictual behavior from either side. Great

54) Azar and Moon, *ibid.*, pp.78~79.

Power may induce the Weak Power to bandwagon behavior using engagement. This bargaining strategy may be employed as Weak Power's desire for side-payment or specific tradeoff for conditional concession to Great Power.

Defy

The conflictual behavior of a Weak Power vis-à-vis a Great Power is defined as defiance. The Weak Power will not give into threat from the Great Power but will continue to defend its position and resist threats from Great Powers. Defiance will be specifically targeted to the issue areas that Great Power greatly values. In defiance, Weak Power would make threats "in the hope that the other would negotiate."⁵⁵⁾ It will venture this policy through "the deliberate creation of a recognizable risk of war, a risk that one does not completely control."⁵⁶⁾ Defiance can be observed as blackmailing, skirmishes, small-group resistance, internal balancing, and balancing with external assistance.

3. Specified Hypotheses

The general hypothesis is that, should the incumbent regime of a Weak Power be threatened internally, we may expect a different outcome of foreign policy choice. I will test whether the regime security of Weak Powers function adequately as an intervening variable affecting the behavioral manifestation by Weak Powers vis-à-vis Great Powers, while the availability of alliance and the levels of external threat essentially function as the outer-environment. Therefore, I treat internal security of the regime of a Weak Power as a variable, meaning leaders must consider simultaneously the political survival of his own and national security.

Hypothesis 1: If the high level of threat and the availability of an ally characterize the external security environment, a Weak Power will balance by joining other Great Power as an ally, therefore conforming to the expectations of neorealism. Thus, external security strategies may be well predicted without the factor of domestic political variables.

Hypothesis 2: If threat level is low, and a Weak Power has an ally available for assistance, the level of regime security will play more influential role for the regime to formulate its external security strategies. The low level of threat is not immediately posing direct threat to its national security and the regime has an option of playing

55) Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p.133.

56) Thomas W. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), p.200.

other strategies before bringing other external help that is already available. In this vein, the regime will bargain with the source of threat in order to induce profitable payoffs. On the other hand, the shaky regime is likely to confront a Great Power. As the threat level is low and alliance is available, the primary concern of the regime is likely to internalize its low external threat by standing firm against the source of external threat.

Hypothesis 3: If high external threat and no available ally characterize the most unfavorable external security environment, the level of regime security is likely to play a decisive role for a Weak Power's security strategies. The solid regime of a Weak Power will formulate its security strategy rationally as induced by the systemic attributes. It will accommodate the high threat of Great Power not only due to its high external threat and unavailable ally, but also its full control of the domestic politics that makes the regime believe resisting would only destabilize its internal politics. On the other hand, the shaky regime of a Weak Power is likely to defy by resisting alone even if no external alliance is available.

Hypothesis 4: If external threat is low and no external alliance is available, the solid regime of a Weak Power is likely to bargain with a Great Power since there is no immediate external threat and its domestic politics seems under control. On the other hand, the shaky regime of Weak Power may actively seek to defy Great Power, as its act of defiance will divert its domestic instability to exaggerated external threat by the regime. The table 2 summarizes the four hypotheses.

〈Table 2〉 Testable Hypotheses

| H | Alliance | Threat | Regime Security | WP* Security Strategy | Examples |
|---|---------------|--------|-----------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1 | Available | High | Solid | Defy | Bring other GP* & Resist (Balance) |
| | | | Shaky | | |
| 2 | Available | Low | Solid | Bargain | Negotiate for specific trade-off |
| | | | Shaky | Defy | Bring other GP & Resist (Balance) |
| 3 | Not Available | High | Solid | Accommodate | Give-in to GP/ (Bandwagon) |
| | | | Shaky | Defy | Confront Alone |
| 4 | Not Available | Low | Solid | Bargain | Negotiate for side payment |
| | | | Shaky | Defy | Confront Alone |

Note) WP = Weak Power; GP = Great Power.

4. Research Methods and Case Selection

For examining the hypotheses, the case study method examines the diplomatic history of the bilateral relationship between the US and Libya from 1978 to 1992. Historical case studies provide most detailed evidence regarding the cause of Weak Power's external behavior processed by the interactions of external security environment and internal political dynamics. Although a single dyadic case generates a problem of generalizability, this case study, however, is carefully crafted to produce a focused, structured and controlled comparison by systematically representing the security environment, capturing the internal dynamics in a Weak Power's security strategy formulation, and linking these two.

I have chosen the Libyan Qaddafi's foreign policy vis-à-vis the US, because this is a hard case to test the hypotheses. The conventional wisdom is that the Libyan foreign policy has been heavily driven by their nationalistic and anti-US ideologies, which are often described as unpredictable, quixotic or even irrational. If this is the case, then we should not have seen much of variations in the Libyan foreign policy to the US from a die-hard resistance to active attempts to bargain during the periods covered in this study. The US-Libyan case lays out a solid springboard for applicability of our framework to other cases of asymmetric conflictual relations in which a Weak Power's ideology is based on indigenous nationalism and anti-American ideology (i.e., North Korea).

V. Case Study: the US - Libya's Qadhafi Regime, 1977-1992

I constructed a research design that involves a longitudinal controlled comparison over four periods: (1) from 1977 to 1980, (2) from 1981 to 1984, (3) from 1985 to 1988, and (4) from 1989 to 1992. These four periods cover three changes in the US presidency, which are Carter to Reagan, and Reagan to Bush. This design generates adequate variations in the two independent (i.e., the US policy to Libya and availability of the USSR as an ally) and one intervening variable in explaining how regime security mediates the effects of external security and generates external security strategies in an asymmetrical relation.

Although the Libyan state is structured around Qadadfi's version of a participatory political system, the balance of power between core-elites (i.e., the Revolution Committee led by Qadadfi) and non-core groups (i.e., the old royalists, discontent tribe leaders and most of all, the Libyan military) fluctuated over the examined periods.⁵⁷⁾ At

the macro level, the stability of the regime has been greatly affected by a dramatic reduction in the oil revenue from the early 1980s as well as the radical policy reform that increased the discontent of the old ruling class, student activists, military and Libyan diplomat corps that competed with the Revolutionary Committee in the mid-1980s. Although Qaddafi's domination over the Libyan masses was strong during the periods covered in this paper, he did not undermine military autonomy effectively; he persistently confronted increasingly formidable challenges from militaries within the regime, especially during the mid 1980s.⁵⁸⁾ The radical socio-economic revolution by the regime after 1978 affected the domestic political development sensitive to its regime security. The cohesiveness of the top Libyan leadership changed over time since the Libyan military leadership especially over the Libyan foreign policy in particular and domestic policy in general resisted the Revolutionary Committee.⁵⁹⁾

1. Case I : 1977 to 1980

The Qadhafi regime enjoyed stable internal security and favorable external security environment. The USSR assisted Libya in expanding its influence in North Africa. Moreover, although US policy to Libya became increasingly hostile and threatening especially as a result of the weakening of the US position in the Middle East and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the US policy to Libya between 1978 and 1980 was less antagonistic compared to the years ahead. The Carter administration employed diplomatic approaches to Libya, although its pressure was escalated towards the end of its administration. The US approached Libya with "the policy of mild, low key punishment of Libya while leaving open the door to possible improvement in relations."⁶⁰⁾

Carter in 1977 identified Libya as a major transgressor on human rights and a supporter of international terrorism and took a non-confrontational approach that ensured diplomatic solutions. Carter pressured Qadhafi through diplomatic manners (i.e., diplomatic letters and envoys) in order to warn him to abandon a plot to assassinate the US ambassador to Egypt. In 1978, the US blocked export items to Libya

57) Omar I. El Fathaly and Monte Palmer, "Institutional Development in Qadhafi's Libya" in Dirk Vandewalle eds., *Qadhafi's Libya 1969-1994*. (New York: St. Martins Press, 1995), pp.157~176.

58) Jason Brownlee, "And Yet They Persist: Explaining Survival and Transition in Neopatrimonial Regimes", *Studies in Comparative international Development*, 37:3 (Fall 2002), p.46.

59) Omar I. El Fathaly and Monte Palmer, *Ibid.*, pp.157~176.

60) Brian L. Davis, *Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the Attack on Libya* (Prager: New York, 1990), p.36.

on the grounds of its continuing support for terrorism. But its policy reversal was made later in the year. On Dec 2 1979, the US closed its embassy in Tripoli after it was attacked by a group of demonstrators allegedly supported by Libyan officials, but did not break diplomatic relations with Libya. In May, 1980, the US expelled four of the five Libyan diplomats in Washington D.C., in view of Libya's continued support for terrorism and aggression towards Tunisia. On the other hand, the Soviet-Libyan relationship became quite friendly; the USSR provided a 440-megawatt nuclear power plant; it also delivered its cutting-edged MiG-25s to Libya in 1978, before delivering to Warsaw Pact states in Eastern Europe. In response to Egypt's rapprochement with Israel and the US in November 1977, Libya strengthened its relationship with the USSR and did not condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.⁶¹⁾

The Revolutionary Committee, a loose assembly of young men whose leaders were handpicked by Colonel Qadhafi from his close entourage, strengthened political stability and revolutionary momentum. The Revolutionary Committees exercised rigid control along with the Presidential Guard and a special Deterrent Battalion, which not only protected the leaders of the regime but had the added task of preempting any attempted coup from the military itself. The Revolutionary Committee before 1981 was institutionalized to propagate Qaddafi's ruling ideology and lacked the actual governing and controlling authority over the state. However its take-over of the Libyan state began on March 2 1979, when the General People's Congress declared the separation of formal and revolutionary authority. From this point on, the Revolutionary Committee exercised its informal power by taking over virtually all segments of the Libyan government, and enforced radical and oppressive policies domestically and internationally. Essentially, the level of the Qadhafi regime security was strengthened by the Revolutionary Committee to defuse opposition in the Libyan society and maintain the tight control over the Libyan armed forces. That Qadhafi had entrusted the Revolutionary Committees with the vital mission of manning air defense positions underscored the extent to which he has deployed them to counterbalance the power of the armed forces. Qadhafi had learned one vital lesson from the often-turbulent Middle East politics, namely that the military has masterminded most coups. Therefore, military commanders were frequently rotated or forced into early retirement.⁶²⁾

While the US during this period approached the Qadhafi regime with a series of engagement policies, the stability of the Libyan Qadhafi regime was the driving factor

61) Tim Niblock, "The Foreign Policy of Libya" in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan eds. *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002).

62) Fathaly and Palmer, *ibid.*

behind proactive conciliatory efforts to persuade the US policy makers that Libya should be taken seriously and was committed to working within the framework of international law.⁶³⁾ Moreover, it was before the Revolutionary Committee took over the regime that the Qadhafi regime showcased a series of conciliatory gestures and bargaining intentions to the US. The Libyan government invited a number of delegations of prominent US citizen, politicians and the president's brother Billy Carter and mother, Lillian, in order to improve the relations with the US. Libya even created academic endowments to universities in the US in hopes of approaching U.S. academia and civilians.⁶⁴⁾

The first case illustrates a case of favorable external and internal security environment, although during this period the US-Libyan relationship was deteriorating. Essentially, the Qadhafi regime proactively approached the US with a series of demands for bargaining, while collaborating with the USSR by obtaining military and political assistance.

2. CaseII: 1981 – 1984

During this period, the bilateral relationship between the US and Libya deteriorated and often led to small-scale military clashes. At the beginning of 1981, the Reagan administration singled out Libya for special attention as a “base for Soviet subversion,” ruled by “the most dangerous man in the world.”⁶⁵⁾ After shutting down the Libyan embassy in Washington in May 1981, the US cited, “Libyan provocations and misconduct, including support for international terrorism.”⁶⁶⁾ In July, 1981, the US announced, “we recognize that African nations need assistance against Qaddafi's diplomacy of subversion and support for international terrorism.”⁶⁷⁾ The Libyan threat was part of the US rationale behind arms sales to Morocco, Sudan, and the sale of 54 M60-A tanks to Tunisia for \$92 billion.⁶⁸⁾ In August 1981, two US F-14s shot down two Libyan jets in the Gulf of Sidra where Libya had claimed maritime sovereignty over 200-miles offshore.⁶⁹⁾

63) Tim Niblock, *Pariah States and Sanctions in the Middle East* (London: Boulder, 2001), pp.22~23.

64) Davis, *ibid.*, pp.36~38.

65) Recited from Davis, *ibid.*, p.39.

66) New York Times, August 4, 1981.

67) Washington Post, July 9, 1981.

68) Aaron Segal, “The United States and Northern Africa” *Current History*, (Dec., 1981), p.403; P. Edward Haley, *Qadhafi and the United States since 1969* (New York: Prager, 1984), p.197.

69) Aaron Segal, *ibid.*, p.404.

In March 1982, the US imposed a boycott on the importation of petroleum products from Libya and established a license requirement for most US exports to that country.⁷⁰⁾ In February 1983, AWAC (Air-borne Warning and Control) surveillance aircrafts were dispatched to Cairo West airfield for a reconnaissance mission in response to an alleged Libyan threat to the Sudanese government. The US began to launch covert operations in the form of disinformation, propaganda dissemination, sabotage, and support for dissident groups. The Reagan administration reportedly advocated the idea of plotting a plan to assassinate Qaddafi, including large-scale operations to overthrow the Qadhafi regime.⁷¹⁾

When the US threat was increasing, Qadhafi made a second visit to the USSR in April, 1981. The USSR made repeated offers of military and technical assistance to Libya. Libya had collaborative relations with the Soviet Union despite policy differences from Afghanistan to Chad. In 1981, Qadhafi concluded technical and economic cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union. Libya continued to purchase sophisticated Soviet arms. Libya acquired an array of mostly Soviet weapons, but they have flatly denied bases in Libya to the Soviet Union and have opposed Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.⁷²⁾ The USSR supported the 1981 treaty of friendship and cooperation between Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen as a means to check US policy in North Africa

While the external security threat was increasing, domestic unrest in the form of military mutinies and attempted coup increased during the period between 1980 and 1983, as observers estimated that there were “as many attempted coups between 1980 and 1983 as in the previous ten years.”⁷³⁾ A substantial amount of political discontent was known to exist during this period. Discontent and its actual expression rose when the militancy of the Revolutionary Committee intensively increased its oppressive control over virtually every section of the regime. Several coup attempts were made. In August 1980, an air-force unit in Tobruk mounted an unsuccessful coup, and subsequently over 2,000 arrests were made and 800 executions were carried out for political offenses. In

70) This resulted in a dramatic decrease in the Libyan oil export to the US from \$8.6 billion in 1980 to \$824, 000 in 1983. See International Monetary Fund (IMF), *International Financial Statistics* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1988).

71) Ronald Bruce St John, *Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), p.125.

72) Segal, *ibid.*, p.402. However, in July, 1981, two Soviet naval frigates visited the naval bases at Tripoli, the first naval visit by Soviet naval forces to a Libyan base. See John, *ibid.*, p.124.

73) Recited from “the Libyan Opposition: Is it a threat to Qaddafi?” Focus on Libya, Center for International Security (July 1984), p.1. in Lisa Anderson, “Qadhafi and His Opposition” *The Middle East Journal* Vol.40:2, (Spring 1986), p.225.

1983, at least eight coup attempts by the military were reported in the international media.⁷⁴⁾ Opposition centered around student groups and self-imposed exiles increased during this time.⁷⁵⁾ In May 1984, a group combined with opposition in the General People's assembly launched an attack on Qadhafi's barracks and lost a number of its members in a bloody shoot out with government forces. This coup attempt occurred during the growing competition between official government and military hierarchies and the revolutionary committees.⁷⁶⁾

As the external threats amounted to increase and the regime security got unstable, its external strategies toward the US became increasingly conflictual (i.e., assassinate key officials of the US and Libyan dissidents). The Revolutionary Committee of the Qadhafi regime began supporting radical organizations that used violence from IRA to Abunibal when its security was highly threatened both externally and internally. It also became increasingly hostile towards the US and Arab states such as Egypt that maintained close links with the US.⁷⁷⁾ The regime successfully diverted the discontent within by criticizing Egypt for bandwagoning with the US and purging military officers and intellectuals by accusing them of being the US collaborators.⁷⁸⁾

The second case needs a more careful interpretation since my model predicted that the Qadhafi regime would defy by bringing the USSR, but it actually confronted alone without bringing in the USSR assistance. That US threat was high and USSR was available as a potential help would predict a balancing behavior. The Qadhafi regime actually defied the US by confronting alone. The increasing level of domestic unrest and unprecedented numbers of leadership challenges resulted in externalizing the internal regime crises by confronting the US directly.

3. Case III: 1985 – 1988

In the aftermath of the December 1985 terrorist attacks on the Rome and Vienna

74) Ronald Bruce St John, *Qaddafi's World Design: Libyan Foreign Policy 1969–1987* (London: Saqi Books, 1987), pp.137~138; Christopher Dickey, "Libya without Qadadfi: Chaos Is feared", *International Herald Tribune* (April, 1986), pp.19~20.

75) Ronald Bruce St John, "Libya's Foreign and Domestic Policies" *Current History*, 80:470, (Dec., 1981), p.429.

76) The US Department of State, Country Briefing on Libya. On-Line. Internet Available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5425.htm>.

77) Hanspeter Mattes, "the Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees" in Dirk Vandewalle eds, *Qadhafi's Libya, 1969–1994* (New York: St. Martin's, 1995), pp.89~112.

78) Tim Niblock, "The Foreign Policy of Libya" in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan eds, *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp.220~221.

airports, the US increased pressure on Libya by terminating all direct economic activities, freezing Libyan assets in the US and rallying the EC governments for imposing economic and political sanctions on Libya.⁷⁹⁾ In February, 1986, the US cut off virtually all the commercial relations with Libya. By early 1986, the US singled out Libya as an example of American resolve to combat terrorism with the toughest possible response. This policy came in implementation in March 1986 to contest Libya's claim to sovereignty over the Gulf of Sidra. Three US carrier groups, including forty-five ships, 200 aircraft and nuclear powered submarines, assembled off the Libyan coast for Operation Prairie Fire. On April 15, 1986, the US Air force and Navy struck six main targets in Tripoli and Benghazi including the Aziziya Barracks, Qadhafi's residence.⁸⁰⁾ In June 1986, the US implemented the termination of US oil companies' operation in Libya.

The USSR did not help Libya during this period, although it verbally criticized the US 1986 raid on Tripoli by canceling a scheduled meeting between Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. It remained an aloof and reluctant ally when Qadadfi's deputy, Abdel Salam Jalloud visited Moscow in May, 1986.⁸¹⁾ Qadhafi was far too independent to be a submissive protégé, despite his dependence on Moscow for military hardware. Many of his beliefs conflicted with Soviet doctrines. In 1985, Qaddafi's third state visit to Moscow did not generate any meaningful cooperation between the two mainly due to the Soviet's reluctance, as Moscow did not see any benefits of maintaining a closer relations with a leader in whom it did not have full confidence. The lack of effective Soviet support to Libya during and after the United States raid on Tripoli in April 1986 underlined Moscow's reluctance to risk a confrontation with Washington by supporting Qadhafi too strongly. In May 1986, the USSR did not extend additional credits for weapon-transfer, rejected a mutual defense treaty and markedly disengaged from Libyan affairs, remaining very aloof and reluctant, thereafter.

During this period, the military remained the most serious threat to the Qadhafi regime. In the 12 months proceeding May, 1986, six coup attempts were reported in the international media.⁸²⁾ By March, 1987, there were signs of disaffection among military officers. In part, this was the result of mounting casualties and setbacks in Libya's war with Chad. Qadhafi's calls for a people's army that would eventually replace the

79) Ronald Bruce St John, *ibid.*, p.132.

80) Geoff Simons, *Libya: the Struggle for Survival* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp.317~8.

81) Ronald Bruce St John, *ibid.*, p.141.

82) Tony Walker, "Why Testing Times Lie Ahead" *Financial Times*, (10 September, 1985); Christopher Dickey, "Libya Without Qadhafi: Chaos is Feared" *International Herald Tribune*, (19-20, April, 1986).

professional military evidently disturbed the armed forces. This was due to the aggressive take-over by the Revolutionary Committee, which often increased their power at the military's expense. In response, the military resented the Revolutionary Committees' interference in national security affairs. It was reported, for example, that brief armed clashes between the two groups took place when certain missile positions were unable to respond to the United States air attacks in April 1986 because revolutionary committee members who were supposed to man them could not be found. In 1988, faced with rising public dissatisfaction over the shortages in consumer goods and setbacks in Libya's war with Chad, Qaddafi, for the first time at the 14th session of the General People's Congress in March 1988, criticized the abuse of power committed by the Revolutionary Committee and implemented to minimize its political and policy intervention in the state affairs.

The Qadhafi regime, despite the US's high threat and actual attack on its soil, continued to defy and be hostile to the US. Obviously, the 1986 US raid on Libya impacted the Qadhafi regime. Its regime security was threatened due to the power struggle between the military and the revolutionary committee. However, the revolutionary committee not only became much more active in crushing dissidents within the leadership and in society but also in seeking to divert attention from the internal security problem by proactively mobilizing anti-American sentiment in the US and advocating and implementing retaliatory policies to the US. In this vein, the Revolutionary Committee launched purges of domestic opponents, "challenging those elements in the Libyan military and elsewhere that the United States had intended to strengthen with the April raid."⁸³ Its actual defiant policy ranged from verbal denunciations of the US, the execution of two kidnapped Britons and one American in Beirut, to an attack on a US embassy employee in the Sudan as well as a Libyan missile attack in the direction of a US installation on the Italian island of Lampedusa.⁸⁴

The third case shows that the external security environment of the Qadhafi regime was the least favorable and the regime security was the most unstable among the cases. The unfavorable external security would predict that the Qadhafi regime would bandwagon with the US, but the outcome did actually turn out that it confronted alone. As the regime, from 1981 on, faced a deteriorating level of internal security, it ventured

83) Ronald Bruce St John, *Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife*, p.139.

84) Robert Keatley, "Experts on Terrorism Fear It May Rise After US Attacks," *Wall Street Journal*, (16, April, 1986); Blaine Harden, "US Aide at Embassy Is Shot in Khartoum," *International Herald Tribune*, (17 April 1986); John Winn Miller, "Italy May Scale Down Ties With Libya After Island Raid," *Wall Street Journal*, (18 April, 1986).

to secure itself by externalizing the domestic political problems: the Revolutionary Committee aggressively pursued radical domestic and international policies to offset the internal problems.

4. Case IV: 1989 – 1992

The Bush administration sought to assess and meet the post Cold War threat to the US and developed a strategy of isolating “rogue states” (i.e., Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Libya). It continued the Reagan administration’s policy of sanctioning rogue states. However, its military aggressiveness towards Libya was lessened due to a reassessment of the global security environment at the beginning of the post Cold War era and its military mobilization to the Gulf. At the same time, the Bush administration used a multilateral approach towards Libya by taking the matters to the UN. Libya’s failure to produce the Lockerbie suspects for trial drove the US, along with the UK to mobilize UN to impose the UN sanction on 21 January 1992. But no military threat was explicitly made out to Libya. With the dismantling of the Cold War structure, the already dismantled relationship between the USSR and Libya deteriorated further. Clearly, the USSR disengaged from its expansionist policies in the Third World including North Africa and was no longer available as a potential ally for Qadhafi.

Qadhafi began to take measures to restrain the role and scope of the Revolutionary Committee in 1989. The militancy of the Revolutionary Committee that had caused popular discontent and military dissatisfaction with the regime, waned and, in turn, regime security became more stabilized. Moreover, the domestic liberalization (i.e., release of political prisoners and grant of freedom of foreign travel) was launched to appease popular discontent in limited scope.

In January 1989, Qadhafi made a conciliatory gesture toward the incoming Bush administration by offering to conduct talks aimed at improving the Libya-US relationship on the issues of disarmament and inspection of weapon factories. In this manner, on January 13 1989, Libya returned the body of a U.S. airman shot down during the American air raids in April 1986. In October 1989, Libya announced its desire to have normal relations with the US. Its relationship with Egypt was normalized by the end of 1990, which was a significant foreign policy decision as it signaled the pursuit of a moderate course vis-à-vis the Arab world.

The fourth case is the opposite situation of the second case. I expected that the solid regime would attempt to bargain, as the secure internal security would provide more political maneuverability to seek more benefits from the threatening Great Power. The

external environment would predict that the Qadhafi regime is more likely to accommodate due to the unavailability of external alliance. But the secured Qaddafi regime consistently attempted to bargain with the US while the US did not explicitly impose military threats.

VI. Conclusion

This study sought a linkage and relevance of domestic politics in a Weak Power's external security strategy through the systematic analysis of a Weak Power's security formulations with specified hypotheses as well as controlled variables of external and internal security environment.

The four longitudinal cases of the US–Libyan asymmetrical relations reveals variations in the Qadhafi regime's behavior towards the US due to interactions of the external environment and the domestic regime security. Despite the difficulty associated with obtaining hard data for analyzing the level of the Qaddafi regime's security, I have found out that the seemingly secure Qadhafi regime in fact went through ups and downs in terms of its leadership cohesiveness while faced with threats from the US. And I have shown that internal conflicts between the military and the Revolutionary Committee precipitated more conflictual policies towards the US. The Revolutionary Committee played the dominant role both in the formulation of the Libyan external policy to the US and in its actual implementation. The Revolutionary Committee, initially designed to guide and control popular opinion and domestic oppositions,

〈Table 3〉 Summary of Cases and Outcomes

| Case | IVs | | BOT* | InV | Model Prediction | Outcome |
|--------------|---------------|--------|-------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|
| | Alliance | Threat | | Regime Security | | |
| I. 1977~80 | Available | Low | Defy (Balance) | Solid | Bargain | Bargain |
| II. 1981~84 | Available | High | Defy (Balance) | Shaky | Defy (Bring other GP& Resist) | Defy (Confront Alone) |
| III. 1985~88 | Not Available | High | Accommodate (Bandwagon) | Shaky | Defy (Confront Alone) | Defy (Confront Alone) |
| IV. 1989~92 | Not Available | Low | Accommodate | Solid | Bargain | Bargain |

Note) IVs: Independent Variable; InV: Intervening Variable; BOT: Balance of Threat Theory.

expanded its own structure to presiding over the ministry of foreign affairs. Libya's behavior to the US and its support for the radical groups abroad were radicalized by the militancy of the Revolutionary Committee. The table 3 summarizes our empirical results and compares them with the balance of threat theory by Stephan Walt.

The case study reveals some limitations and findings that require further researches and thoughtful conjectures. First of all, the level of threat is as powerfully predictive of Libya's strategy as the level of regime security. The table 3 shows that the high level of the US threat seems to be associated with a strategy of defiance by the Qadhafi regime, while the low threat with a strategy of bargain. Thus, the external threat level stimulates a Weak Power's external behavior. But it alone is not a sufficient variable to determine a Weak Power's behavior towards the source of threat. The case study does in fact lack variations in these two variables. I acknowledge that I need cases with high (low) threat and solid (shaky) regime security to make more concrete arguments on this point.

Secondly, the model proposed in this study expected that the availability of alliance for a Weak Power would result in balancing behaviors. On this point, I assumed the same prediction made from the balance of threat theory in general. However, it was turned out that the availability of alliance did not significantly affect Libya's external behavior, especially when the Qaddafi regime was unstable. This point accords with the main argument of this study: when a domestically unstable regime of a Weak Power is under direct threats from a Great Power, the regime's preoccupation with the domestic affairs may arguably shape a Weak Power's external behavior towards a threatening Great Power. In this sense, regime security seems more salient than the availability of alliance when predicting and explaining Libya's security strategy in conflictual asymmetric relations. Thus, one may argue that even in conflictual, asymmetric relations, the domestic politics of a Weak Power is, to an important degree, relevant in predicting its external behavior. This finding contradicts Jack Snyder's argument for irrelevance of domestic politics in a Weak Power.⁸⁵⁾ Moreover, as opposed to Walt's argument, when threatened directly, a Weak Power's behavioral tendency to bandwagon with the source of threat may not be well predicted by the unavailability of alliance. A Weak Power is likely to confront a threatening Great Power alone for the domestic purpose when its regime security, which may seem irrational from the neorealist perspectives. But this "irrational" behavior may make senses from the domestic political perspectives of the shaky regime that aspires to maintain its power.

85) Snyder, *ibid.*, pp.317-318.

Lastly, from the table 3, it is noted that the level of threat and the level of regime security co-varies. While too premature to draw a conclusive relationship between the two, intuitively the regime security of a Weak Power may be highly vulnerable to external threats from a Great Power. The level of threat and the level of regime security may have more explanatory capacity for Weak Power than alliance availability. But further researches should focus on unpacking the relationship between the level of external threat and the level of domestic regime security, and their linkages to behaviors of Weak Powers vis-à-vis Great Powers, perhaps by employing a large-n analysis.

The findings of this study offer the contextual implications to Great Power's strategy towards Weak Powers in the Contemporary World. A high level of threat by a Great Power may not effectively resolve conflictual situations with a Weak Power, as the Great Power desires. Simply, it is less likely to "scare down" Weak Powers but more likely to make them resist more. Obviously, whether a Weak Power's defiance strategy will succeed or not is a different question. Unless a Great Power physically invades and makes the regime of a Weak Power "kneel down" by employing its military power, as we just saw in Iraq, its likelihood of success for threatening a Weak Power to accommodate may not be as high as the Great Power intends it to be.

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